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Throughout the twentieth century, as judges and lawyers have mo-
notonously conceded, legal institutions have defaulted on their obli-
gation to provide justice to all. This is surely because the ideal of 
equal justice is incompatible with the social realities of unequal 
wealth, power, and opportunity, which no amount of legal formal-
ism can disguise. In an unequal society, the Haves usually are bet-
ter served by legal formalism than the Have-Nots, a disparity that 
creates a persistent legitimacy crisis.! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are three conclusions that any observer of dispute resolution in 
this country must draw. 
First, the vast, vast majority of dispute resolution involves low-income 
disputants? By "dispute resolution" I mean not only adjudication, but also 
the massive number of administrative proceedings and the increasing use of 
alternative dispute resolution, especially mediation. 
Second, the vast, vast majority of the public and private resources of 
dispute resolution are anocated to disputes involving wealthy individuals 
and organizations? By "resources of dispute resolution," I mean the re-
sources of legal representation (including lawyers and the apparatus of 
lawyering, such as administrative assistants, experts, and paralegals) and the 
resources of third parties who aid in dispute resolution (judges, arbitrators, 
I. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 143-44 (1983). 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 16-26. 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 11-14,26-40. 
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mediators, and the apparatus of the offices of such actors, such as adminis-
trative assistants, clerks, bailiffs, and the like). 
Third, any principled moral or ethical analysis demonstrates that the 
stakes are much higher in disputes involving low-income disputants than in 
disputes involving affluent individuals or organizations. Eviction, losing 
minimal subsistence benefits, the welfare of children, and the risk of starva-
tion are matters of consequence. Low-income disputants do not have the 
lUXUry of pursuing claims driven by principle or ego, or to accumulate fur-
ther wealth, or to pursue greater profitability. In lives where the basics of 
life are at risk, disputes virtually always involve food and shelter, life and 
death. 
One final conclusion is thus inescapable: The matters that attract a 
minute percentage of dispute resolution resources are the matters that im-
plicate issues offood and shelter, life and death. 
Although the phrase "resources of dispute resolution" is novel, the 
situation described has long been recognized as an appalling state of affairs, 
albeit one whose outrageousness is almost matched by its imperviousness to 
reform. There has always been-and remains-far more in the way of 
empty platitudes and even emptier gestures toward reform than any mean-
ingful change in how things are done. And as even a cursory glimpse at the 
current dispute resolution scene reveals, the situation continues to worsen 
each year.4 As a result, real people are suffering. 
I take on the grim realities presented here without the usual common-
places of optimism for a better future or of a vision of exciting vistas of 
problems solved if only an author's proposals for reform became a reality. 
The problems are too persistent and structural, the stakes too high, for such 
indulgences. But it is precisely because the problems are so persistent and 
structural, and because the stakes are so high, that to refrain from doing or 
saying anything borders on complicity with the perversions of justice that 
are occurring on a massive scale. 
I begin with a bit of autobiography. I began my legal career as a litiga-
tion associate at a large firm and later became a staff attorney at a neighbor-
hood civil legal aid office. I describe these vastly different experiences. I 
then pick apart the phenomenon of unequal justice with a new unit of analy-
sis: resources of dispute resolution (RDR). Three straightforward principles 
comprise "RDR theory." The operation of these principles generates iron-
clad hierarchies in terms of the quality of dispute resolution. 
With these ideas as a basis, I then examine the real-life consequences of 
RDR theory. This t3-kes the fann of a kind of cook's tour of the dispute 
resolution universe at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This tour 
necessarily focuses on the less popular destinations, or at least less popular 
with those who do not have to go there-the shadowy places in courts, ad-
ministrative agencies, and mediations where the overwhelming bulk of dis-
4. See infra text accompanying notes 33-40. 
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pute resolution occurs in places utterly unlike TV courts or the relatively 
well-heeled corridors of the federal practice of elite law firms. 
I conclude with two proposals, each of which, if properly funded and 
pursued (a big and potentially insurmountable ij), can break the stranglehold 
of forces that have caused the powerless to be persistently and tragically 
shortchanged in dispute resolution. 
II. A PERSONAL HISTORY 
Before entering academia, I was a litigation associate at a law finn and 
then a staff attorney at a Legal Aid Society Office where I represented the 
indigent elderly. What follows is an account of my experiences in those law 
offices.s 
A brief note about these recollections: I make no claim that my descrip-
tions are representative of anything other than my own experiences. Indeed, 
my perspective is necessarily my own, which is that of a lawyer doing cer-
tain kinds of work, not of a client, and it is the experience of clients that is 
ultimately what matters most in the issues I address. Moreover, while this 
account suggests some (but by no means all) of the themes I develop in my 
succeeding analysis, I have not structured it with this in mind. 
Nevertheless, this description does disclose the impact which my ex-
perience has had on my view of these issues.6 Even considering its limita-
tions, it acts as something of an introduction to what follows-a comparison 
of actual professional experiences which startled me, causing me to consider 
issues of access to justice in a more systematic fashion. 
A. At the Finn 
One group of shareholders wanted to do one thing, another group 
wanted to do another thing. The first group filed a lawsuit in federal district 
court hoping to enjoin the pending transaction. 
I was in my office Friday at 5:00 p.m. A partner caIJed. New case. 
Much work. Much work turned out to be two weeks of (at least) fifteen-
hour days. But the point was not that I had to work for fifteen-hour days; 
the point was that there were fifteen-hour days for, by my rough estimate, at 
least eleven other attorneys plus an array of others charged with logistical 
S. A note about what follows: These recollections are a composite of how I personally experi-
enced two profoundly different practice contexts. They are not a literal retelling of specific cases. 
Moreover, I have omitted all identifying information and allered and combined facts in order to preserve 
client confidentiality. Finally, these descriptions arose from my experiences at particular times and at 
particular places. While the balance of the Article will draw larger conclusions that, I believe, resonate 
with what I experienced, I make no assertion that these experiences reflect the "truth" or current realities 
of the specific practices I describe. 
6. Such disclosures have become increasingly common in many forms of social science research. 
MARGOT ELY ET AL., ON WRITING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: LIVING By WORDS 32-52 (1997). 
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support for the troops, including, but not limited to, feeding, answering 
phones, typing, proofreading, arranging trips, driving, and flying. 
The essence of the game was the preliminary injunction stage. If we 
succeeded there, we would, for all practical purposes, win. 
I was assigned research--one limited, relatively elementary point on 
preliminary injunctions. The issue was standard stuff-the sort of thing that 
lawyers scavenge from other briefs and stick in an early paragraph, secure 
in their knowledge that the judge will ignore it. 1 researched for days, 
spending hours in front of my computer terminal, reading through hundreds 
of unpublished cases in search of that case that really was directly on point. 
I wrote up a couple of paragraphs, handed it in, and it made its way up the 
hierarchy and, as far as I was concerned, out of my consciousness and into 
oblivion. 
As 1 researched, other tasks were parceled out in neat, bite-sized 
chunks. Limited, relatively elementary points for research were assigned, 
one, more or less, per young, able-bodied associate. Multiple affidavits 
needed to be drafted, one affidavit per lawyer. Discovery needed to be con-
ducted in a far-off state. A group of three traveled a thousand miles to re-
view reams of documents in a warehouse-a largely empty exercise, as 
revealed by partners' impatient looks when the leader of the document-
examining team offered telephonic status reports. 
The moment drew nearer when the brief would be due. One lawyer was 
saddled with the task of taking bits and pieces of research and turning it into 
a workable draft of our opposition brief. The draft then circulated to those 
in the team who mattered (mattering determined exclusively by dint of sen-
iority). The changes continued, draft succeeding draft, as the rough-hewn 
draft was successively sanded down and polished. Then, one day, the senior 
partner decided the draft was not good enough and smashed it to bits, after 
which it was rearranged, circulated to those in the team who mattered, and 
the process repeated; and repeated; and repeated. 
During this time, I happened to go into the computer room one day and 
came upon a new member of the team, an associate junior to me. I asked 
her what she was researching. She looked at me sheepishly; a partner had 
given her my own little preliminary injunction point to look into again. 
"[He] just told me to spend a couple of hours on it to see if I could turn up 
any other cases," she said. 
It was her second day on the project. 
The activity reached a crescendo as the Monday approached when we 
would have to SUbluit our brief. I worked all day Saturday. We were toid 
Sunday night would be late; therefore, there was no need to arrive too early 
on Sunday. Ten a.m. was fine. 
Sunday morning arrived. A large conference room had been set aside, 
with tables full of people. Lawyers were lawyering, paralegals were parale-
galing, word processors were word processing, proofreaders were proof-
reading, delis were delivering. My role was as a sort of a utility infielder, 
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ready at a moment's notice to do whatever was needed. So I did a little bit 
of this and a little bit of that. 
We stayed all night. The brief needed to be out the door by about 4:30 
p.m. on Monday, leaving a paralegal thirty minutes to leap into a waiting 
limousine, go the few blocks to the courthouse, and file the brief before the 
clerk's office closed. As Monday wore on-no one had slept since Sun-
day-it became clear that there really was not much for me to do anymore. 
I was told to stick around anyway. Monday afternoon came. To my horror, 
someone had managed to finagle an extension of a few hours from the 
clerk's office. Two p.m. came. Three p.m. came. Four p.m. came. 
Having decided that this situation had, at long last, reached a point be-
yond the absurd, I decided to go up, find the partner, confirm that my ser-
vices were no longer needed and, assuming that they were not, go out into 
the hall, enter the elevator, and leave. I climbed the stairs to the office and 
walked in. There were about six people in the office. The partner had a 
draft of the brief in his hands. He was reading carefully, making changes 
here and there, the junior partner by his side ready to rush off so the correc-
tions could be entered. Everyone else was either standing or sitting, doing 
absolutely nothing. I got the sense that no one dared leave until the brief 
was out. There could still be that final affidavit that needed to be drafted or 
that final line of research that needed to be pursued. 
The senior partner asked someone about a point of grammar. There was 
a response. 
I asked a senior associate if I could leave. He shrugged his shoulders, 
his eyes on the ground. I left. 
* * * 
One day, I received a call from a partner. 
"How would you like to go out West tomorrow morning?" 
"Sure," hesitating just a moment as I pondered when last I did my wash. 
My secretary tried to make reservations for me at a hotel. The only 
available hotel she could find <:;ost $325 a night. Checking with colleagues, 
the consensus was, well, you have to sleep somewhere (of course, no one 
considered that that somewhere could include a Holiday Inn). 
The following afternoon, I found my way to the airport in a limousine, 
met three other associates, and flew first class. We arrived very late. We 
would meet early the following morning and finally learn what it was that 
we would be doing. 
I was shown to my room, or, rather, rooms. There was a wet bar, a 
sunken living room, kitchen, a huge bathroom larger than my bedroom at 
home complete with telephone and television, hangers that could be re-
moved (top hook and all), and a king-sized bed. 
As I began to unwind, I was startled to hear a knock at the door. It was 
room service. 
"A complimentary bottle of wine to welcome you, sir." 
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"Ah yes, of course. Thank you." 
I didn't open it. After all, this was work. 
As it turned out, prodigious consumption of hard alcohol would not 
have affected my performance. Upon arrival at our client's office, we were 
met by three more attorneys from another firm representing the client. The 
actual task at hand was a mind-numbing exercise in adding lists of numbers 
for reasons that were obscure to me and, I suspect, to everyone else there as 
well, with the possible exception of the person who dreamed up the exer-
cise. I was completely at a loss to understand what special expertise I had 
to perform what was, in effect, elementary school arithmetic. In fact, I was 
awful at it, having gone to law school precisely to avoid this sort of thing. 
Of course, in order to engage our interest during breaks, we ate at excel-
lent restaurants, at one point ordering champagne at the insistence of a sen-
ior member of our dinner party. 
The trip lasted two days. After the project was deemed finished (by fiat 
of the senior lawyer there, given that he was the only one who ostensibly 
knew why or what we were doing to begin with and, thus, the only one ca-
pable of offering an opinion as to completion), the question arose about 
what we should do about the results. The decision: Keep a set of our pa-
pers in one associate's office for future reference in the event our conclu-
sions (whatever they were) should become significant. 
Some years later, I checked to find out what happened to our project. It 
had generated no interest. As far as I know, no one ever looked at it again. 
B. Segue 
A turning point in my legal career came when I was asked to research 
issues relating to "right to counsel" on behalf of a corporate client that was 
the subject of a criminal investigation. One of the cases I came across was 
Powell v. Alabama7 -the "Scottsboro Boys" case. I began reading it as I 
always read a case on my job--scrutinizing it for facts and principles appli-
cable to the client's case. And then an excruciating disconnect, a kind of 
intellectual and emotional vertigo, began to take hold. I got some cover 
letters together and sent them out to places that seemed to work in the inter-
est of worthy causes. 
I interviewed with The Legal Aid Society. On the day of the interview, 
I had just received a complaint on an insurance matter that I needed to re-
view. The Legal Aid office was covered with graffiti. The reception room 
had chairs of the plastic molded variety. I felt their rough texture before I 
sat, somewhat gingerly, and began, incongruously, to review the complaint. 
I was interviewed. I was hired. I was later told that I was the only ap-
plicant for the position from private practice who had not been fired by his 
firm. 
7. 287 u.s. 45 (1932). 
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Upon my announcement of my departure at the firm, one partner cau-
tioned that I was about to leap from a professional precipice. Some were 
indifferent. Some were wistful about a path they wish they had taken (in the 
abstract, of course). Another questioned why I would give up "cutting-edge 
legal work" to "stop little old ladies from getting evicted." I chuckled with 
one partner about how clients could now suddenly obtain my services for 
$170 an hour less than they had been previously paying. 
C. At the Legal Aid Office 
Housing Court in Brooklyn is nothing like a court. On the outside, it 
does not say "Court." It has the look of hundreds of nondescript office 
buildings that clutter blocks of the city. Inside, the nerve center is the fifth 
floor, a long, narrow, L-shaped corridor lined with six courtrooms. The 
courtrooms range in size, from modest to tiny. At calendar calls, there are 
never remotely enough chairs for litigants. People line up in the aisles, 
some with children, some with canes or walkers, all with varying degrees of 
hopelessness. Air conditioning is nonexistent. On summer mornings, as 
things pick up by around 10:00 a.m., the corridor seethes with desperation. 
The air is heavy, the noise deafening. Shouting matches are common, 
fainting spells regular. So what happens? Landlords haul urban sufferers 
one-by-one out of obscurity and into the glare of the legal system, or rather, 
a legal system, because a definite article implies a uniform system, and the 
legal system is nothing if not utterly lacking in uniformity. 
In terms of its procedures as well, Housing Court is nothing like a court, 
at least as a court is understood in popular culture. The vast majority of 
landlords have lawyers. The vast majority of tenants do not. Even the sem-
blance of an individualized adjudication of rights and duties is a sham. Poor 
people, many of whom know little or nothing of legal arcana and are justly 
terrified of losing their homes, typically waive all rights and agree to pay 
large sums of money without legal counsel. The agreements to pay money 
are usually based on the chance-dubious at best-that City welfare agen-
cies will pay the agreed amount of arrears. Such failure-to-pay cases pro-
duce the bitter irony of a heretofore indifferent government suddenly 
spurred to action, the action being forcible eviction and the result being 
homelessness. 
People do not pay rent for a vast number of reasons: senility, drug ad-
diction, physical impairments, elder abuse, low-wage jobs, and countless 
other reasons. Landlords notice that rent is not being paid and commence a 
legal proceeding. Housing Court then becomes a kind of furnace where 
seething social crises and human suffering are melted down and metamor-
phosed into a tidy sum of money owed by one party to another. Rarely does 
the process resolve anything; if money is paid, the underlying problems 
usually remain and sooner or later the process repeats itself. If the money is 
not paid, the tenant is evicted and rendered either permanently homeless or 
thereafter bounces from shelter to shelter. 
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Here is a relatively typical case. It is not especially sympathetic-just 
typical. There was a client, extremely elderly and suffering from mental 
impairments, who lived with one of her two daughters. The daughter, it 
seemed, failed to contribute rent because of a drug habit. The landlord filed 
eviction papers, which the daughter seemed to have answered from time-to-
time, signing, during one of those times, a "Stipulation" which waived all 
the rights of the elderly woman. The woman was brought in by her grand-
daughter. 
Apparently, the woman received Social Security benefits which, while 
meager, were just enough to cover her rent and, in combination with food 
stamps, her food expenses. In other words, the usual bare bones subsistence 
benefit. She gave the benefits directly to her daughter. It turned out that, 
upon examining her records, her rent was too high, the eviction papers de-
fective, and the amount agreed to by her daughter fictitious, among many 
other issues. The woman was utterly confused, had no idea what her rent 
was, what season it was, or where she was. She received a 72-hour notice, 
which means that she could be evicted at any time three days after service 
of the notice. The date of the notice was one week prior to her visit with 
me. She might have been getting evicted as she sat in my office. 
I called up the City Marshal, whose secretary told me there was no evic-
tion scheduled for that day or the next (these offices will not tell you any 
more in advance than that; it keeps you guessing). I quickly filed papers the 
next day to stay the eviction. 
When the case came up to be heard, I met with my adversary. I gave 
him a brief description of my client, an elderly, impaired woman who had 
enough money to pay her rent but who was confused and just needed a little 
help. We needed a little time to help her to her feet. 
His response: "I want my money!" 
I told him there might be some money due, and we could probably get it 
from the City; we just needed to sit down. "Give us a couple of weeks, and 
we can work it out." 
His response: "I want my money!" 
I got angry, and, for once, I decided to engage in a more global discus-
sion of the process, with this case just being an example. I told him not 
everything is money. Sometimes people get old, get confused, things hap-
pen, and you need a little patience. The system stinks, it doesn't work, I 
know it's not necessarily his fault, but it takes time to work these things out. 
His response (a little louder than before): "Give me my money!" 
I got before the judge, told him the situation, got a little time, and, I'm 
sure much to my adversary's satisfaction, I got him the money. 
The moral of the story: If my client's granddaughter had not brought 
her into my office and my office had not agreed to represent her, which 
happens all too often, she would be on the street. 
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* * * 
I had submitted a set of motion papers on behalf of an elderly woman 
threatened with eviction. For Housing Court, my papers were a monstros-
ity, containing a ten-page brief with ten exhibits attached. Of course, by 
standards of my former law ftrm, I probably would have been ftred for con-
veying in ten pages what could have been communicated in forty. 
The motion was set to be heard in Part 18, a huge room on the ftrst floor 
complete with wooden benches, microphones, and hundreds of unrepre-
sented tenants who have no idea what is going on. The clerk called my cli-
ent's case. I went to the bench, and there the judge sat, impassive, a kind of 
Buddha in robes. Most of her desk, it seemed, was taken up with my mo-
tion papers. 
She glanced at the pile of papers, and a look of disgust slowly crossed 
her face. 
She said, "I'm not reading this pile of shit." 
Turning to the clerk, she asked who was sitting in Part 18 the following 
week. 
"Judge Roe? Good. Case adjourned for one week. Next?" 
My client remained at risk of eviction for that much longer. 
* * * 
Compared to my maximum ftrm workload of six active cases at a time, 
my typical workload at Legal Aid was at least 40 active cases, and many 
more than that were potentially active. It was not unusual for me to handle 
multiple cases in Housing Court. My personal record was six. Even though 
much of the activity occurs on the ftfth floor, there are also courtrooms on 
the ftrst, second, and sixth floors, not to mention other Civil Court court-
rooms on many other floors. The bulk of my court days thus entailed run-
ning up and down stairs (the elevators were way too crowded), collaring 
adversaries in stairwells and hallways, and drafting and signing settlement 
agreements in the frenzy of the scene. 
The physical toll was extraordinary, and, as physical tolls tend to do, it 
affected my mental functioning. But shed no tears for me; imagine what 
happened to my clients. On several occasions, I was so happy to be through 
with my day in court that I forgot to tell my client what happened on her 
case. This happened once to a client with a prosthetic leg; I only realized 
that I had left him in the courtroom just when I got to my subway on 
DeKalb Avenue. I would get messages from clients whom I knew were my 
clients but about whose cases I could recall nothing. Whereas my law ftrm 
had a "Managing Attorney's Offtce" in charge of getting forms, ftling pa-
pers, and doing so many of the other clerical things that law practice re-
quires, I was, more often than not, my own one-man Managing Attorney's 
Office. 
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There were none of the many other luxuries of Wall Street. No word 
processing departments, proofreaders, after-hours receptionists, or after-
hours secretaries. No paralegals to assist you in cases. No cars to clients, 
messenger deliveries, secretaries, Xerox departments, mailrooms, mini-
mally-stocked law libraries, or on-line legal research tools. All of this ham-
pered my ability to effectively represent such a huge number of clients. 
All of this said, my life as a legal aid lawyer was nothing compared to 
what my clients experienced. My clients were also a tiny minority of the 
masses whose cases were processed through Housing Court and, as a result, 
were flatly unrepresentative: After all, my clients, unlike most litigants, 
were represented. 
A recurring thought-at the law firm, I almost never met clients. All 
cases were about money. At Legal Aid, I always met my clients-my many 
hundreds. And while cases, at a certain level, were about money, they were 
really about scraping together enough money to subsist with a modicum of 
comfort and dignity. 
Ill. DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESOURCES AND THE MARKET FOR LEGAL 
SERVICES 
My brief description of life in two law offices demonstrates how dis-
putes attract different levels of the resources of dispute resolution, or RDR, 
the resources from whatever source that are directed towards resolution of a 
particular dispute. This section introduces concepts and mechanisms that 
lay the foundation for understanding the distribution of RDR. Building 
upon this material, the next section identifies principles that determine how 
different disputes attract different quantities of RDR. 
A. The Components of RDR 
RDR is comprised of two components. First, in a system characterized 
by "disputing through agents,',8 a major component of RDR is the time, 
compensation, and expenditures generated by the provision of legal ser-
vices. The most obvious element of this component is lawyers, but lawyers 
represent only a fraction of the total here. Other sources include the ex-
penses of law offices, paralegals, administrative assistants, filing clerks, 
process servers, mailrooms, word processors, consultants, experts, and so 
forth. Given that what lawyers do and the resources they control are largely 
driven by econoI11ics, the market for legal services shapes, in fundamental 
ways, which clients are represented and how cases are resolved. 
The second component involves time and compensation for third-party 
actors who have a role to play in resolving disputes but are not part of an 
8. This phrase was coined by Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: 
Cooperation and Conflict Between wwyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509 (1994). 
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advocacy team for one side or another. These actors include judges, juries, 
arbitrators, mediators, as well as those who facilitate the work of these ac-
tors (clerks, bailiffs, administrative assistants). Such actors-judges and the 
cost of judicial facilities and assistants-have traditionally been supplied by 
the State through general funds. In recent years, third-party actors-namely 
arbitrators and mediators-have been able to be retained and paid directly 
by parties. I will return to this distinction at a later point in this Article,9 but 
for purposes of the macro view of RDR that I am now sketching, the dis-
tinction is not significant. 
As I will describe shortly, the quantity of the first component of RDR-
legal services-largely controls the quantity of the second component-the 
cost of third-party actors. Examining the market for legal services thus con-
stitutes the first step in exploring this territory. 
B. The Marketfor Legal Services 
Unlike criminal cases, there is no constitutional right to representation 
in most civil cases IO_a fact of which almost eighty percent of the popula-
tion is unaware. I I Given that there is no state mandate to provide represen-
tation, the market controls the distribution, availability, and quality of legal 
services. Given the nature of market dynamics, lawyers are attracted to 
areas of practice where there is substantial money to be made. There is sub-
stantial money to be made from clients who have enough resources to direct 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 94-103. 
10. Lawsuits that sought judicial recognition of a "Civil Gideon" right to counsel in civil cases were 
largely abandoned in state and federal courts in the last ten to twenty years, although there has recently 
been a revival of attempts in Maryland and Washington. Richard Zorza, Some Reflections on Long· 
Term Lessons and Implications of the Access to Justice Technology Bill of Rights Process. 79 WASH. L. 
REV. 389, 398-99 (2004); Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003) (a four-to-three decision. declin-
ing to reach issue of "Civil Gideon" rights). See also Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil 
Defenders: A Right To Counsel for Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POCY I 
(2003). In any event, it is rather startling and disturbing to learn that such a right is recognized as a 
matter of constitutional or statutory law in most industrialized nations. See James Earl Johnson. Jr., 
Equal Access To Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrialized 
Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. S83 (2000); Robert J. Rhudy, Comparing Legal Services to the 
Poor in the United States with Other Western Countries: Some Preliminary Lessons, 5 MD. J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 223 (1994). This is particularly ironic in light of how the United States has 
three times as many lawyers per capita than other industrialized nations. Richard H. Sander & E. Doug-
lass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 431, 432 (1989). 
Even the achievement of a "Civil Gideon" is not necessarily an answer. One need look no fur-
ther than to how we administer the criminal justice system, in which criminal defendants do have Gideon 
rights and which display shocking inequities. See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1785, 1788-89 (200 I); Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal 
Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003). 
Given that this footnote contains the first citation to Deborah Rhode, I should note that Professor 
Rhode, who has done crucial work on access to justice, published a book as this Article was going to 
press that summarizes and elaborates on her ideas. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). 
See also Colloquium, Deburah L Rhode's Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 841 (2004). 
II. Rhode, supra note 10, at 1792. Even more shocking in my experience, this percentage might 
only be modestly less even among law students. 
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to the provision of legal services. There are three classes of clients who fit 
this description. 
By far the most important and the most numerous are commercial or-
ganizations. Not all such organizations, of course, have significant re-
sources to divert to legal services or, for that matter, to anything else; many 
organizations are small, struggling, or just starting up. That said, successful 
organizations tend to have far more resources at their command than indi-
viduals because they represent, by definition, an aggregation of resources. l2 
As a result, "[c]ommercial clients command a huge fraction of legal effort, 
effectively squeezing the interests of individuals ... to the margins.,,'3 
Lawyers from elite law schools aggregate in elite large firms in order to 
provide legal services to these clients for handsome compensation. l4 Law 
schools offer classes in areas of importance to large commercial clients be-
cause future lawyers demand to be trained in them because there is money 
to be made in working for them directly or through law firms. Legal pub-
lishers provide vast numbers of treatises, specialized reporters, and other 
research support in these areas. A corps of experts grows to provide consul-
tations and testimony on commercial matters. 
Another class of clients that can afford substantial allocation of re-
sources to legal services is affluent individuals. Given the cost of legal ser-
vices, these individuals must be spectacularly affluent indeed; being merely 
"well-heeled" likely will not suffice in today's market. 
A final class of clients is somewhat different in character from commer-
cial interests and affluent individuals. These are clients who are engaged in 
"values conflicts."ls These tend to be individuals who seek to promote a 
distinct value, whether it be moral, political, or religious. Such clients can 
command substantial resources for legal services not because they them-
12. Gillian Hadfield makes this point as follows: 
[Tlhe fees lawyers charge are high ... because the market is fundamentally characterized by 
a bidding competition between commercial actors and individuals for access to scarce legal 
resources. This is a competition commercial actors ... overwhelmingly win because of the 
great disparity in resources between commercial/organizational entities and individuals. Le-
gal fees are high precisely because legal resources are, as a result of free market forces, 
pulled disproportionately into the commercial sphere, and individuals are largely priced out 
of the market. 
Gillian Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System. 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 953. 956 (2000). An additional factor that further enhances the resources available to organiza-
tions is that "[c]orporate legal fees are tax-deductible," while fees paid by individuals are not. Id. at 998. 
13. Id. at 961. Evidence suggests that the disparity in resources devoted to commercial disputes 
continues to increase over time. Id. at 962. Marc Galanter, "Old and in the Way": The Coming Demo-
graphic Transformation of the Legal Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of '--egal Services, 
1999 WISC. L. REv. 1081, 1088 ("An ever increasing share of the ever-growing legal services 'pie' is 
purchased by businesses and government rather than individuals."); Sander & Williams, supra note 10, 
at 470-71 ("[T]he fastest growing demand for legal services has come from the business sector."). 
14. There is no question that the vast majority of clients of large firms are business organizations. 
See. e.g., Sander & Williams, supra note 10, at 440-41. 
15. In terms of theories about the nature of conflict, such "values conflicts" are also distinct from 
other types of conflicts. For an influential model of conflicts that includes such "values conflicts," see 
CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING 
CONFLICT 60 (1996), setting forth the "Circle of Conflict" which includes value conflicts. 
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selves have substantial resources, but because organizations that initiate and 
litigate these cases themselves represent aggregations of resources from 
like-minded constituencies. Moreover, this is one area where substantial 
numbers of attorneys are willing to participate at reduced or no fees both 
because such cases represent values they share and because these cases at-
tract significant public and professional attention. In a sense, values con-
flicts are the sole instance of cases in which legal service providers inject a 
substantial amount of legal services resources at their own expense. 
Once litigation involving large business interests, affluent individuals, 
and "values clients" are accounted for, what's left? With only modest ex-
ceptions, a massive number of cases involve low-income disputants who do 
not have money to pay for a lawyer. Any public interest lawyer knows that 
the categories into which these cases primarily fall-family law, public 
benefits, and housing (which is mostly, but not exclusively, landlord-tenant 
cases)-account for almost three-quarters of requests for subsidized legal 
assistance. 16 Of course, even this is misleading, because such data can only 
track requests for legal assistance; in many instances, indigent litigants as-
sume they owe money, particularly in consumer debt collection cases, and 
thus do not see the need to request representation. This assumption is em-
phatically not the case, as even a passing familiarity with the law of con-
sumer protection-a richly patterned and complex set of federal and state 
statutes and common-law causes of action l7-and the scourge of predatory 
lending, payday loans, and other unfair and deceptive lending practices 
demonstrate. 
To the extent there is money to be made by lawyers in these and other 
cases involving low- or even moderately resourced clients, profitability de-
mands an enormous volume of cases to generate adequate income. ls This is 
the case, for example, in most immigration, government benefits (particu-
larly Social Security Disability cases, which can be handled on a contin-
gency basis that can generate meaningful attorney's fees when retroactive 
benefits are at stake),19 workers' compensation, and, especially, bankruptcy 
and uncontested divorce practices. Such volume practices are profitable 
only insofar as cases are simple and uniform; any matter out of the ordinary 
either does not get handled or is handled as simplicity and uniformity de-
mand, that is, by stripping away complexity and nuance.20 
16. Rosalie R. Young, The Search for Counsel: Perceptions of Applicants for Subsidized Legal 
Assistance, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 551, 582 (1997-1998). 
17. See infra text accompanying note 116. 
18. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change. 9 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 95, 117 (1974). For a fascinating case study of the market forces facing a 
law firm that seeks to serve individuals of modest means, see PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, 
THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LA WYERS: CASE STUDIES 49-66 (1988). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2000) (attorneys may be awarded "a reasonable fee ... not in excess 
of 25 percent of the ... past-due benefits" awarded to a claimant). 
20. /d. 
2005] A Theory of Access to Justi~ 103 
Apart from such practices, the balance of legal services to indigents is 
provided by a corps of poorly compensated public interest attorneys strug-
gling under massive caseloads?l To add insult to injury, most of these law-
yers must also labor under federally imposed restrictions on the nature of 
their practice if their offices are funded even partially by the Legal Services 
Corporation.22 The compensation differential between lawyers at elite firms 
engaging in primarily business litigation and all other lawyers is only get-
ting more pronounced over time.23 
And what is left once the market works its magic? Different measures 
reflect grim realities. Roughly eighty percent of the legal needs of the poor 
remain unmet. 24 Of the total expenditures on lawyers, the amount of this 
total ~ent for the representation of the "official" poor is less than one per-
cent.2 Vast numbers of low-income and even moderate-income disputants 
cannot afford lawyers and must proceed pro se.26 Even when a low-income 
disputant is lucky enough to have a lawyer, such lawyers command minis-
cule dispute resolution resources and, as a result, can only allocate a tiny 
percentage of even these minimal resources to each client because of mas-
sive caseloads. Moreover, such law practices-marginalized as unworthy, 
low-status, or "easy,,27 among the larger legal community-do not demand 
much judicial time; as I will detail shortly, since a lawyer has little time for 
individual attention to each case, little time can be demanded of third-party 
actors. Of course, the impetus for allocation of judicial resources when a 
litigant is unrepresented is even less. The end result is increasingly smaller 
RDR per case. Another term for it is mass justice. 
Given the low-status nature of this work and the relatively few lawyers 
who engage in it at all, law schools offer virtually no courses on issues of 
21. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Representing Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm for 
Poveny Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1087-88 
(1995) (describing overwhelming caseloads weighing down poverty lawyers). Given the intensity of this 
practice, another unfortunate consequence for indigent disputants is that the minimal compensation and 
crushing workloads leads to "burnout." As a result, as advocates gain experience, they often lose the 
energy to continue the grueling pace and minimal financial compensation generated by this work. 
22. Restrictions on Lobbying and Certain Activities, 45 C.F.R. §§ 1612.1-1612.11 (2003); Class 
Actions, 45 C.F.R. §§ 1617.1-1617.4 (2003). Lawyers have mounted court challenges to these restric-
tions. While most restrictions remain in effect, in one instance the Supreme Court held that the restric-
tions' prohibition against challenging existing welfare laws violated the First Amendment as impermis-
sible "viewpoint discrimination." Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,542-43 (200l). The 
LSC restrictions have led to the emergence of non-LSC funded entities in many states. Alan W. House-
man, Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L. & 
POL'y REV. 369,370,381 (1998). 
23. Hadfield, supra note 12, at 984; Sander & Williams, supra note 10, at 449-51. See also infra 
text accompanying note 243. 
24. Deborah Rhode, supra note 10, at 1785. 
25. Id. at 1788. 
26. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting 
the Roles of Judges, Mediators. and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999). For an interesting 
empirical study which includes interviews with unrepresented disputants, see, e.g., Young, supra 
note 16. 
27. For a critique of these characterizations, see infra the text accompanying notes 108-120. 
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particular interest to the pOOr.28 Apart from clinics, many of which repre-
sent low-income individuals and, increasingly, community organizations,29 
the best most law schools can do in terms of traditional doctrinal courses is 
catch-all courses on "Poverty Law." While well-intentioned, such courses 
could never expose students to the bewildering array of poverty law issues 
in any detail. To illustrate this point, consider a course on business law that 
includes antitrust, secured transactions, taxation, business organizations, and 
securities regulation all packed into a single three-credit course. Such 
courses do not exist. Poverty law courses do. The market drives law school 
curricula as surely as it drives the provision of legal services. 
IV. THE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Everyone-lawyers, judges, academics, the public-knows that the 
"rich" get more justice than everyone else. Lawyers who practice in spe-
cific areas-be it commercial litigation, landlord-tenant, bankruptcy, family 
law, or any other defined area of practice-know that there are disparate 
levels of process accorded to parties depending on whether the parties have 
significant resources or not. In my view, however, there is much more to be 
said on this topic. In fact, identifiable mechanisms operate which divert 
RDR to different categories of disputes. Such mechanisms are not immuta-
ble laws of the universe; rather, they are immutable laws given the norms 
and realities of a dispute resolution system that is, like ours, characterized 
by "disputing through agents," that distributes legal services through market 
dynamics, and that involves significant differentials of wealth among dispu-
tants who can, as a result, command different quantities and qualities of 
representation. 
A. The Three Principles of RDR 
Once the market works its influences on the legal profession, three prin-
ciples allocate RDR to different sorts of disputes. While there are necessar-
ily outlying instances that are anomalous, these principles determine RDR 
allocations for the vast majority of disputes and describe with precision the 
macro allocations for different categories of disputes. 
The First Principle of RDR: Disputants purchase, to the extent possi-
ble, adequate legal representation to insure a fair chance of success in re-
solving a dispute. Given the centrality of disputing through agents, con-
sumers of legal services necessarily want a "good lawyer" (or, in some in-
stances, good lawyers) to pursue or defend claims. Disputants, however, 
will not at least knowingly overdo it if they do not have to; in other words, 
28. Rhode, supra note 10, at 1786 ("Access to justice ... is not a core concern in ... law school 
curricula. "). 
29. [ discuss the significance of such "community lawyering," infra, in the text accompanying notes 
231-254. 
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if, from the perspective of a disputant, an individual matter is not "high-
stakes," the First Principle of RDR only holds that the disputant, to the ex-
tent possible, will purchase "adeqqate" legal services. 
The Second Principle of RDR: Only disputants commanding significant 
resources have meaningful choices about the quantity of legal services de-
scribed in the First Principle of RDR. Given that the market has generated 
high prices for individualized representation, the caveat to the extent possi-
ble in the First Principle of RDR swallows that principle for the vast major-
ity of litigants. Most disputants either cannot afford a lawyer at all, in 
which case their only "choice" is to try (often unsuccessfully) to obtain sub-
sidized legal assistance if they meet income guidelines, or they can purchase 
the services of an affordable lawyer, which, in most instances, means buy-
ing the services of a lawyer engaged in a volume practice. In either case, 
such disputants must take what they can get: Their limited or nonexistent 
resources do not permit meaningful choices about the quantity of legal ser-
vices they can purchase. 
As I have already described,30 there are three categories of disputants 
for whom the extent possible is not a limitation and, as a result, the First 
Principle of RDR truly determines choices about how much to spend on 
legal services in a given dispute. These disputants are (1) commercial enti-
ties, (2) affluent individuals, and (3) values disputants. 
The Third Principle of RDR: The greater the magnitude of the legal 
services component of RDR, the greater the magnitude of the third-party 
actor component of RDR. This is an ironclad relationship. Courts in the 
American system are "reactive institutions,,3l with judges acting "as umpire, 
while the development of the case, collection of evidence and presentation 
of proof are left to the initiative and resources of the parties.'.32 As a result, 
the more lawyers demand of third-party actors, the more such actors must 
react by providing services in return. The more lawyers there are and the 
fewer numbers of cases that they have (a situation characteristic of larger 
firms), the more intensive the disputing and the more resources such a law-
yer or lawyers can demand of third-party actors. 
While these three principles focus on individual cases, taken together 
they have profound systemic implications. The First and Second Principles 
award control of total RDR to high-resource disputants. The Third Princi-
ple ensures that when high-resource disputants deem it appropriate to inject 
significant legal services into a dispute (and this is, as I will show, almost 
always when facing a high-resourced opponent),33 third-party actors ac-
commodate by allocating more of Llteir own resources. This, in tum, further 
magnifies the need to allot ever greater amounts of legal services which, in 
turn, magnifies the third-party allocation even further. The magnitude of 
30. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15. 
31. Owen Fiss, Against Seuiement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073. 1085 (1984). 
32. Ga1anter. supra note 18. at 120. 
33. See infra text accompanying notes 37-93. 
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RDR allocation for such disputes increases explosively, with each compo-
nent of RDR intensifying the other. Disputes outside of this whirlpool-
that is, virtually all disputes-are left with a shrinking pie of both legal ser-
vices and the services of third-party actors. The justice system copes with 
these disparities largely through rules of jurisdiction-a process I will ad-
dress shortly?4 
B. Examples 
The best way to illustrate how these principles operate in the real world 
is to examine how they play out in different categories of disputes. The 
following is necessarily brief and by no means exhaustive, but it does offer 
some flavor of a good portion of adjudication as it is now practiced 
I will, for now, defer consideration of collections cases to a subsequent 
discussion of how subject matter jurisdiction affects the allocation of RDR35 
as well as consideration of the increasingly important issue of alternative 
dispute resolution and especially mediation36-a process that cuts across 
most of the categories of cases I discuss. 
1. Commercial Disputes 
Commercial disputes come in many shapes and sizes. Small and me-
dium-size companies often resort to adjudication to resolve contract or 
business tort disputes that arise in the normal course of business. In such 
instances, the parties have adequate resources so that the Second Principle 
brings the First Principle into play, and meaningful amounts of legal ser-
vices are usually brought to bear in the hopes of obtaining a successful re-
sult. These disputants will still usually have substantial constraints for ex-
penditures on legal services. Thus, under the Third Principle, the third-
party actor component generates substantial, but not lavish, amounts of 
third-party actor RDR. Indeed, the typical operation of jurisdictional limits 
in many jurisdictions insures that even relatively modest business disputes 
are adjudicated in relatively high-resource courts of general jurisdiction, 
while most individual claims, deemed smaller by dint of the amount in con-
troversy, are adjudicated in lower-resource civil or small claims courts of 
limited jurisdiction?7 
In any event, the very model of lavish RDR allocations are in the rela-
tively few cases that involve large business organizations as disputants and 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 135-51. 
35. See infra text accompanying notes 135-37. 
36. For detailed discussions of mediation and RDR theory, see infra the text accompanying notes 
94-103, 192-93. 
37. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE 
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 10 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter EXAMINING THE WORK 
OF STATE COURTS). I discuss the role of jurisdictional limits and their impact on implementing RDR 
allocations in greater detail infra in the text accompanying notes 135-15\. 
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that involve prodigious amounts of money; these are the takeover battles, 
business insurance disputes, contract litigation, and business torts which 
occupy the litigation departments of large firms. In such circumstances, the 
adequate legal representation to insure a fair chance of success mandated 
by the First Principle is spectacular indeed; it is spectacular because ade-
quacy means that each side must take into account the legal army being 
assembled by the other. The resulting legal teams involve numerous law-
yers, multiple firms, and the full panoply of support personnel that charac-
terize legal services at its most profligate and excessive.38 
This legal arms race has an impact not only on the amount of legal ser-
vices RDR allocated to such disputes; under the Third Principle, the greater 
the magnitude of legal services RDR, the greater the magnitude of third-
party actor RDR. It should thus come as no surprise that the courts with the 
greatest resources at their disposal and with the highest status-the federal 
courts-have increasingly transformed themselves into specialized fora 
adjudicating "high-stakes. 'bet-the-company' business cases.,,39 These 
cases demand a disproportionate amount of judicial time, even within the 
federal system, in comparison with most other types of cases-by one esti-
mate, they "consumed more than twice the judge time of prisoner cases and 
social security cases combined.'.4{) Put simply, these cases demand far more 
third-party RDR on a national scale than other types of cases do because, 
under the Third Principle. the glut of legal resources devoted to them so 
demands it. 
38. Another factor that generates such an "anus race" arises from imprecision in determining when 
legal work is finished. After all, at 
the big corporate firms ... [r]esearching a complex legal issue or writing a brief is much like 
writing a novel: The results are never perfect. . .. In this sense, a greater supply of lawyers 
will tend to create more legal work, simply because more work will be done more thor-
oughly. (And who is to say it is done too thoroughly?) 
Sander & Williams, supra note 10, at 471. 
39. Bryant G. Garthy, Tilting the Justice System from ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented 
Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927.941 (2002). Interestingly and unsurprisingly, 
two classes of mass justice cases that do make it to federal courts are Social Security Disability and 
prisoner pro se actions, both of which are subjected to various procedural mechanisms through which 
they receive less attention than the sorts of commercial disputes that are the bread and butter of the 
federal judiciary. See infra text accompanying notes 140-146. 
40. Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six: Or, the Federal Courts Since the Good Old 
Days. 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921, 944. Interestingly, despite all the political and popular excoriation of 
"trial lawyers" and the "litigation explosion," available evidence suggests that the largest increase in 
civil filings in the federal courts have been in commercial litigation. Id. at 945. In contrast to the many 
calls for "tort reform," an empirically verifiable "explosion" in commercial litigation is never cited as 
warranting legislative reform. See infra text accompanying notes 72-73. 
Another massive component of the elite bar that often passes underneath the radar screen are the 
"transactional" lawyers-the large numbers of lawyers who advise commercial organizations on busi-
ness transactions of various sorts. While these lawyers are not litigators, their expertise is almost exclu-
sively for high-resource entities-a point to which I will return later. See infra text accompanying notes 
249-52. 
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2. Landlord-Tenant 
In urban jurisdictions with substantial low-income populations who are 
renters, landlord-tenant matters generate a massive volume of cases. The 
quality of adjudication in such places depends, of course, on individual ju-
risdictions, but the overall picture is grim. A particularly appalling example 
is Baltimore's aptly-named "Rent Court," which functions in many ways as 
a "collection agency that operates for the convenience of landlords.'>'!} In so 
doing, landlords' rights are vindicated "with smooth and speedy dispatch," 
while tenants' rights are not because tenants have no idea what their rights 
are and there are no lawyers available to educate them.42 An equally infa-
mous example is New York City's "Housing Court," which, finally, after 
many years of deplorable conditions and hundreds of thousands cases set-
tled in minutes in hallways with landlords' lawyers negotiating with pro se 
tenants,43 has been the subject of some reform, the results of which remain 
• • 44 
10 questIOn. 
Places like these-and there are, of course, many others45 -are virtually 
invisible to the legal community or the general public, except to those un-
fortunate enough to have to go there. These places are, however, exemplars 
of how RDR theory works. In virtually all instances, only one party-the 
landlord-has adequate resources to retain an attorney. While there are, of 
course, many landlords who own one or two small buildings, the bulk of the 
cases are brought by larger players-substantial property owners who own 
numerous properties and make money renting to many low-income tenants. 
These property owners can afford individualized legal representation if they 
so desire and may make such a selection if they are involved in a divorce or 
a dispute with a commercial entity. But the First Principle of RDR does not 
say that relatively high-resource disputants must pay lots for legal services; 
it says only that they will pay for adequate representation to insure a fair 
chance of success in resolving a dispute. Given that they are virtually al-
ways facing pro se disputants who cannot afford any representation at all, 
41. A System in Col/apse, ABELL REP., Mar. 2003, at 1,5. 
42. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices 
in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 533-35 (1992). 
43. See, e.g., Mark H. Lazerson, In the Hall of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in THE 
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JuSTICE 119 (Richard Abel ed., 1981). The obvious abuses inherent when 
represented parties "negotiate" with non-represented parties are explored in Russell Engler, Out of Sight 
and Out of Line: The Needfor Regulation of Lawyer's Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 
85 CAL. L. REV. 79 (1997). Engler concludes that in such situations, lawyers often mislead and misrep-
resent the law or facts to pro se litigants. [d. at 130-57. 
44. See Engler, supra note 26, at 2063-69. Such impulses towards reform, while generated by the 
best of intentions, often "become a symbolic substitute for redistribution of advantages." Galanter, 
supra note 18, at 149. 
45. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 26, at 2057-63 (describing Boston's "Housing Court"); Trina 
Drake Zimmerman, Representation in ADR and Access to Justice for Legal Services Clients, 10 GEO. J. 
ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 181, 195 (2003) (on a typical day at Boston's Housing Court, 141 of 208 cases 
on the docket were set for trial, and in these trials, "landlords were represented in 111 cases, tenants were 
represented in 13 cases"; Cook County courts handle about 40,000 eviction cases in a year, in which 
only about 10% of tenants are represented). 
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landlords only need minimal legal services to meet the requirements of the 
First Principle, and that is what they purchase. Attorneys who represent 
landlords in such courts typically have numerous cases through a volume 
practice, accord minimal if any attention to individual cases, and occupy 
low status within the profession. Even still, they usually win because only a 
little representation goes a long way in these fora. 
Given that there is no incentive to expend substantial resources on legal 
services, Principle Three keeps the total RDR very low. These courts adju-
dicate staggering numbers of cases. Baltimore's Rent Court, for example, 
has only one judge assigned to it per day, and yet that judge often has a 
docket of 1,050 cases in a single day. 46 As a result, "the average case re-
ceives less than 30 seconds of judicial review.'>,!7 In such an environment, 
even the most well-intentioned judges cannot help but be benumbed by 
overwhelming dockets and constrained by a system that could only function 
by according virtually no process to individual cases. They can only hope 
for and encourage maximum numbers of settlements and default judgments, 
and the system accommodates them.48 
An irony is that in the rare instance that a tenant can obtain a legal ser-
vices attorney, the tenant will likely be successful.49 While no doubt frus-
trating to landlords and their attorneys in these individual cases, such in-
stances do not trigger any change in RDR allocations because it is the ag-
gregate that matters. Landlords, in the end, remain confident that their 
minimal investment in legal services will succeed most of the time. There is 
no incentive to spend more on legal services; thus, there is no trigger to in-
crease the third-party actor component of RDR; thus, you have Rent Court 
and Housing Court. 
It is here, as always, important to keep in mind what is being adjudi-
cated. In these cases it is shelter. State-sponsored forcible eviction, at best, 
generates extreme hardship on individuals and families (including, often, 
children) and, at worst, generates homelessness or, sometimes, even death. 
3. Government Benefits 
A massive adjudicatory system for low-income claimants operates in 
the shadowy realms of administrative agencies. These are even less under-
stood and observed by those who do not participate in them than landlord-
46. A System in Collapse, supra note 41, at 2 (emphasis added). Even more remarkably, this 1,050 
total is an administratively imposed limit. /d. 
47. Jd. For a rare judicial recognition of these realities, see 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 
N.Y.S.2d 956,960 (1992), wherein the opinion notes that cases in New York City's Housing court are 
"disposed of at an average rate of five to fourteen minutes per case, with many settlements in the range 
of five minutes or less." 
48. Bezdek, supra note 42, at 578-82 (describing the sources and mechanisms for the large num-
bers of default judgments in Baltimore's Rent Court). 
49. For example, one study found that represented tenants were successful 90% of the time. 
SEPTEMBER JARETT & MICHAEL MCKEE, HOUSING COURT, EVICTIONS, AND HOMELESSNESS: THE 
COSTS AND BENEATS OF ESTABLISHING A RIGHT To COUNSEL 8 (1993). 
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tenant cases.50 These cases, taking place primarily in the Social Security 
Administration and before a patchwork of state departments of social ser-
vices, typically address the availability, amount, or termination of benefits 
such as food stamps, Medicaid, social security, and Supplemental Security 
Income, and the variety of state programs funded through the federal block 
grant program known as "Temporary Assistance for Needy Families" 
(TANF).51 While these cases on occasion percolate through the judicial 
system and generate appellate decisions, such instances are exceedingly 
rare. 
Despite the opacity of these proceedings to the public and to most prac-
titioners, they unsurprisingly manifest qualities reminiscent of the courts of 
mass justice, albeit with variations generated by the specific nature of these 
proceedings. There are large caseloads for administrative law judges,52 lim-
ited or nonexistent legal representation for claimants,53 and simplified pro-
cedures that operate to the detriment of claimants.54 Evidence suggests an 
alarming lack of uniformity in decision-making in these fora, with adminis-
trative law judges' political or personal proclivities, largely unchecked by 
procedure or external review, counting for even more than in judicial pro-
ceedings.55 Such tendencies are only becoming more pronounced as the 
50. The lack of attention paid to these procedures by the public and the profession are the result of 
the unfortunate conjunction of two characteristics. First, they involve indigents, and the experience of 
how mass justice courts operate "publicly" with virtually no public scrutiny means that such administra-
tivc proceedings are hardly candidates for much attention. Second, they are administrative in nature and 
thus neither present the spectacle of jury trials so beloved in popular culture nor generate the appellate 
decisions so beloved of academics. All of this, of course, is utterly beside the point to the claimant who 
desperately needs government benefits to achieve minimal levels of subsistence. 
51. 42 U.S.c. §§ 601-{)3 (2000). This Program replaced the prior "Aid To Families with Depend-
ent Children" ("AFDC"). 
52. In terms of workload, however, administrative law judges (A.LJ.) are luckier than their judicial 
counterparts. Cases typically do not even come before an A.L.I. until, first, a claimant applies for bene-
fits, and, second, appeals a denial, change, or termination of benefit levels. See, e.g., 20 C.P.R. § 
416.1430 (2004) (listing predicates required prior to a hearing before an A.L.I. in Supplemental Security 
Income cases). Some claimants, of course, do receive appropriate benefits. Thus, A.L.I.s, in effect, act 
as appellate fora. This status screens out numerous cases that need not be appealed or that a claimant 
does not know should be appealed because there are no lawyers to so advise. 
53. "[PJublic and private legal agencies and advocates for the poor describe representation for 
public benefit issues as a priority and a major unmet need. " Young, supra note 16, at 570. 
54. The process first identified as due in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and at least pur· 
portedly defined by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), has been largely abrogated in practice. 
See infra text accompanying notes 152-58. 
55. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND ApPEALS 21 (1978). This is not 
necessarily surprising, given that A.LJ.s, unlike other judges, have a "basic obligation to develop a full 
and fair record" which ''rises to a special duty when an unrepresented claimant unfamiliar with hearing 
procedures appears before him." Lashley v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 708 P.2d 1048, 1051 
(6th Cir. 1983); Clark v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 399,404 (5th Cir. 1981). This peCUliarity of judge acting 
as both lawyer and decision-maker no doubt further exacerbates the consequences of political biases 
against or in favor of claimants. 
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stripping away of benefits as entitlements56 intensifies the ad hoc nature of 
decision-making in this area.57 
In terms of RDR analysis, some twists distinguish administrative adju-
dication from judicial adjudication. Like most tenants, only a tiny percent-
age of claimants for government benefits can obtain legal assistance.58 
Principle Two thus disables Principle One. The third-party actor compo-
nent~ontrolled through Principle Three-is, however, even paltrier than 
in mass justice cases in courts for three reasons. First, a private attorney 
rarely represents an opposing interest. Thus, no external spur generates 
even a modest allocation of third-party RDR under the Third Principle. 
Second, given that administrative agencies often act as both adjudicator and 
opposing party, and given that they have sole control over the third-party 
actor allocation in most instances, they have a significant disincentive to 
allocate any more third-party actor resources than absolutely necessary. 
This is especially true for social welfare agencies that, as a rule, are primary 
targets for budget cuts. Finally, even mass judicial adjudication is public 
and thus must make at least some attempt, however hollow, at being an im-
partial and meaningful forum for the resolution of disputes. Administrative 
adjudication, largely private and utterly invisible, has no such incentive. 
One telling variation on the recurring theme that the interests of indi-
gent disputants always lose involves the speed of adjudication in mass jus-
tice administrative fora. Mass justice courts are models of efficiency; given 
that such courts invariably adjudicate claims against indigents, they display 
an extraordinary ability to issue judgments in record time with minimal 
process.59 In contrast, mass justice administrative fora almost invariably 
invol ve claims by indigent disputants for benefits. As a result, the wheels of 
adjudication or even of processing initial applications for assistance often 
grind at an agonizingly slow pace.60 Given that claims for government 
benefits are made by the most impoverished among us, such inefficiency 
intensifies the desperation of the already desperate. 
Interestingly, although also little-noted and little-studied, high-resource 
disputants often participate in administrative fora as well. These are not, of 
course, social welfare agencies. Rather, they include agencies such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the 
56. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRA) is quite explicit 
in stating that the law "shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any 
State program funded under [the Act)." Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996), 
57. See Houseman, supra note 22, :It 386-87 ("['.V)e are moving from a systelll of advocacy based 
on applying federal law and rules to state agency practices to a system that is fact-based and relies on 
effective and persuasive presentation of facts and options to agency decisionmakers. "). 
58. See. e.g., Young, supra note 16, at 570. 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49. 
60. In a representative example of the appalling delays that afflict cases subject to administrative 
adjudication, one federal magistrate observed that "it has taken six years for this relatively simple claim 
to work its way this far through the system, approximately two years of that time having been expended 
by the Appeals Council in deciding that it would not review the claim." Jacobs v. Barnhart, Civil Action 
No. S-01-2788, slip op. I n.l (D. Md. Oct. 7, 2002). 
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Federal Communication Commission, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, and so forth. As RDR theory 
would predict, these agencies, faced with substantial allocation of legal ser-
vices, magnify the third-party component with much lower volume, more 
process, and more time and energy expended on each case on the part of the 
decision-makers.61 
Putting such agencies aside, what are the stakes in proceedings within 
agencies that adjudicate government benefits claims? Anyone applying for 
such benefits is, by definition, grindingly impoverished. The amounts at 
issue, when viewed from the perspective of the larger culture, are pitifully 
small62 yet critical when no other resources are available. Indeed, delay or 
failure to award such subsistence benefits-as well as improper termination 
of them-lead to other cases that comprise poverty law-evictions, collec-
tions cases, and increased domestic violence.63 
4. Personal Injury 
Personal injury cases are something of an oddity because they are a very 
rare example of matters where disputants of modest means can command 
significant resources of legal representation.64 The reason is that contingent 
fee arrangements operate to make commercial interests fund the costs of 
legal representation in successful cases. As a result, the typical defendant in 
personal injury cases-resource-rich commercial organizations or insurers 
or both-are the source of substantial attorney's fees, thus providing an 
incentive for attorneys to represent such clients.65 Put in RDR terms, per-
sonal injury plaintiffs meet the requirements of the Second Principle vicari-
ously by gaining access to the resources of the party they are suing. 
Given this anomalous state of affairs, RDR allocations can be consider-
able in these cases. The substantial amount of legal services resource at 
61. Indeed, as is often noted, such agencies are 'captured' by the entities they are designed to regu-
late-a circumstance somehow unlikely to happen in social service agencies. 
62. The amount of Supplement Security Income varies by state, although currently the highest 
allowable amount is $552 per month, at 
http://www.aarp.orglmoneyllowincomeheip/Articles/a2oo3-05-02-lowincome_ssi.htmi(last visited 
Mar. 22, 2005). 
63. Houseman, supra note 22, at 386; Shelly Kintzel, The Effects of Domestic Violence on Welfare 
Reform: An Assessment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act as 
Applied to Battered Women, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 598-602 (2002) (collecting authorities on the 
relationship between poverty and domestic violence). 
64. The only other examples that come to mind-consumer class actions or variations on the class 
action theme such as shareholder derivative suits-similarly have elements of contingent fees in that 
courts award attorneys' fees in successful (which virtually always means settled) cases, and, thus, the 
large resource commercial entity pays the costs of legal representation for its adversary. Such cases, 
apart from being much less common than their occasional notoriety might suggest, have also been sub-
jected to intense criticism because it is not unusual for attorneys to receive far more than the modest 
amounts awarded to individual members of the plaintiff class. As with other instances of small resource 
plaintiff against large resource defendant, stories of abuses on the part of plaintiffs are greatly exagger-
ated. See generally Charles Silver, We're Scared To Death: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003). 
65. Hadfield, supra note 12, at 956. 
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play means that, under the Third Principle, third-party actors must respond 
with RDR allocations of their own. Indeed, most of these cases are litigated 
in the same courts as are business disputes and even, on occasion, make it to 
federal court.66 These cases are also notable in that while, like most cases, 
the vast majority settle, a non-trivial number do go to trial, and jury trials at 
that-the ultimate in third-party actor resource allocations. 
That said, the oddity of this circumstance-low-resource disputants tak-
ing on commercial organizations in something approaching parity67_ 
generates consequences that strikingly illustrate how outside the norm these 
cases are. First, personal injury lawyers experience the lowest public esti-
mation of a profession already held in low regard; stereotypes about "ambu-
lance chasers" and "shysters" cling to personal injury lawyers, not to Wall 
Street lawyers. Non-personal injury attorneys often join in this tarring and 
consider themselves as far away from such low-prestige work as being 
members of a theoretically unified profession will allow. 58 Such waves of 
contempt appear to arise, at least partially, from how such work involves the 
representation of low-resource disputants against commercial interests. 
Second, a personal injury practice, for all of its potential windfalls and 
its rhetoric of fighting for the little guy, still has much in common with the 
non-contingent fee volume practices that I have already described.69 It is no 
secret that in order to be profitable, personal injury lawyers must take on a 
portfolio of numerous cases, out of which a lawyer hopes that some will 
generate significant returns to offset the many that do not.70 This often 
leads to simplifying cases, dropping cases that tum out not to be lucrative, 
quick settlements, and other practices that diminish the individualized atten-
tion that is the hallmark of the hourly billing practice of elite firms repre-
senting commercial interests. In other words, the qual ity of representation 
is, to say the least, not always up to the gripping portrayals in the popular 
media.7 ! 
Third, and perhaps most telling of all, the relative parity of the playing 
field in personal injury cases has generated a ferocious attack by the defen-
dants' bar. Indeed, out of all of the appalling inequities in the justice sys-
tem, so-called "tort reform" is the one issue relating to the administration of 
66. For a discussion of the influence that jurisdiction has on RDR allocations, see infra the text 
accompanying notes 135-51. 
67. The distinctiveness of personal injury cases in this regard has long been recognized. Galanter, 
supra note 18, at 110 (noting how personal injury cases "are distinctive in that free entry to the arena is 
provided by the contingent fee"). 
68. It is interesting that these attacks use the code word "tria! !awycrs"-a subtle way to marginal-
ize one component of the profession from the rest that does not sully itself with such activities. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
70. Roy D. SIMON, JR. & MURRAY SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 579 
(3d ed. 1994). 
71. A recent famous account of a personal injury action also made into a popular film is JONATHAN 
HARR, A CNIL AcnoN (1995). While the intensity of the litigation in that book is hardly typical of 
personal injury practice, in a sense, the book at least demonstrated the financial advantages of defendants 
as the plaintiffs' lawyers struggled to maintain the litigation prior to receiving compensation through a 
contingent fee. 
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justice that is on the national political radar screen. This is ironic not only 
because the number of tort filings is actually falling,72 but also because the 
usual rhetoric of such attacks-that personal injury awards increase prices 
to the consumer-is, if anything, more true of hugely expensive commercial 
litigation undertaken by elite law firms; yet redressing such excesses is 
never mentioned in political discourse, let alone the subject of serious pro-
posals for reform.73 
There is, nevertheless, more than enough self-serving rhetoric to go 
around in this debate. While professed concerns for consumer pricing and 
out-of-control litigiousness mask economic self-interest on the part of the 
defendants' bar, the professed concern for the rights of "ordinary Ameri-
cans" on the part of the plaintiffs' bar is similarly disingenuous; after all, 
there are plenty of rights at stake in family law matters, consumer cases, and 
landlord-tenant disputes, but contingent fee arrangements in these cases 
either do not or cannot generate substantial attorneys' fees.74 As with so 
much else in this arena, the level of compensation drives what principles the 
profession decides are worth fighting for. 
In the end, debates about tort reform divert attention from issues of far 
greater import. As a function of sheer numbers, "[t]orts are only a small 
fraction of lawsuits," while "business litigation is growing faster.,,75 More 
importantly, while victims of negligence deserve redress and legal assis-
tance, many more who are lucky enough to escape such misfortune remain 
in desperate need of legal assistance to put food on their tables and roofs 
over their heads. 
5. Family Law 
Family law disputes are critical to any consideration of access to justice. 
Such cases account for about one third of requests for legal assistance in the 
72. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 37, at 24-25 (noting that tort filings 
decreased in 30 states surveyed, representing 73% of the United States population). 
73. Another interesting aspect of this is that all of the public ridicule of frivolous personal injury 
lawsuits involving spilled coffee vastly distorts the field. In fact, "[t]he truth, established by every 
reputable study, is gross underclaiming and gross undercompensation of the largest claims." Richard 
Abel. Big Lies and Small Steps: A Critique of Deborah Rhode's Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too 
Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1019, 1023 (1998). As to the presumed 
litigiousness of average Americans, virtually every study that has examined the issue has found restraint, 
not excess. See, e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 17 (1990); Young, supra note 16, at 571. 
74. In the case of family law cases, the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit contingent fees. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(l) (2003). In the case of consumer and landlord-tenant 
disputes, there is typically no money from the debtorltenant side from which to collect a fee. In one of 
innumerable iterations of RDR theory, it is ironic that, at least in consumer cases, collections attorneys 
can and do establish contingent fee arrangements which provide that their fee will be a percentage of 
damages they recover. However, debtors, by definition. typically have no damages from which to col-
lect fees and, thus, virtually no ability to obtain counsel. 
75. Abel, supra note 73, at 1023. 
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United States-the highest total for any category of cases.76 Apart from the 
sheer volume of family law cases, such cases are distinctive for a number of 
other reasons: (1) The nature of family law excludes commercial litigants 
as parties-an extraordinarily unusual, and perhaps unique, characteristic; 
(2) family law is the only significant category of cases that presents substan-
tial numbers of disputes where all parties have few resources; (3) family law 
is the only significant category of cases where low-resource disputants and 
high-resource disputants are both frequent players, albeit with low-resource 
disputants appearing in much greater numbers; and (4) family law cases 
often directly or indirectly have an impact on vulnerable non-parties who 
are of extraordinary importance, namely children. 
Even with all of these distinctive characteristics, the Principles of RDR 
grind away as they do with everything else, with typical consequences. The 
vast majority of family law disputants have few resources and, thus, few can 
afford lawyers.77 As a result, the first two Principles of RDR do not apply, 
but the Third Principle does. Given the negligible amount of legal services 
resources expended on both sides of the "v." in such cases, the Third Princi-
ple diverts minimal third-party actor resources. What is left are mass justice 
courts adjudicating family law matters. 78 
A tragic and wrenching consequence of the operation of these Principles 
in this area is that what is at stake in many family law cases-the well-being 
of children-is extraordinarily high, while, at the same time, the RDR allo-
cated to disputes involving low-resource disputants is astonishingly low. 
Another tragedy is that even though "[w]omen in low-income households 
experience violence at significantly higher rates than women with higher 
annual incomes," their economic status plummets further post-separation, 
and the numbers of battered women far outstrip the numbers of lawyers 
available to represent them. 79 In such circumstances, victims of domestic 
violence who are unrepresented-an increasingly common phenomenon-
76. Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. PuB. L. 123-
24 (1993). 
77. See Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce Media-
tion in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 165-66 (2003) (gather-
ing data that "[t]he number of pro se litigants in family cases has increased dramatically in recent years" 
and "that di vorce proceedings where both sides are represented by counsel are no longer the norm; 
rather, they are surprisingly rare"); Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on 
Lawyers and Judf!,es to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'y & L. 499, 511 (2003) 
(describing an empirical study which found that only 25% of women had a lawyer for civil protection 
hearings). In terms of gender breakdowns, "[ wjomen, including battered women, are less likely to be 
represented than men." Ver Steegh, supra, at 166. 
78. Ver Steegh, supra note 77, at 167; Rhode, supra note 10, at 1793. 
79. Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know Thatfor Sure: Questioning the Efficacy of 
Legal Interventionsfor Battered Women, 23 ST. LoUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 38 (2004); Carrie Cuthbert et 
aI., BArTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD 
CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSEITS FAMILY COURTS 68-69 (2002) (describing testimonials from bat-
tered women who could not afford representation). 
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operate under more than a mere "disadvantage;" their lack of representation 
constitutes a danger to the victim and to the victim's children.80 
In the relatively few family law matters where significant resources are 
at stake, that is, in cases involving affluent disputants, all of the principles 
of RDR come into play, with the end res~lt being that parties divert signifi-
cant resources into legal services in order to reach a fair chance of success, 
and, as a result, the Third Principle allocates a substantial quantity of third-
party actor resources to such disputes. Ironically, given that it is not un-
usual for both sides to have access to resources in cases involving affluent 
parties in family law, the quality of dispute resolution may be more intensi-
fied, but the relatively even playing field insures that neither side has a par-
ticular advantage. As with commercial disputes, the Principles generate a 
kind of stalemate. 
In any event, these represent a tiny percentage of cases. The real bot-
tom line? As one commentator has compellingly put it, "civil courts take 
weeks to try a commercial dispute between wealthy businesses but give less 
than five minutes to decide the future of an abused or neglected child."sl 
6. School Desegregation Cases 
I will conclude this survey with a brief discussion of a series of cases 
that, on their face, differ substantially from what I have discussed previ-
ously. While how they ended up should not be surprising,S2 tracing this line 
points to a heretofore unaddressed aspect of the RDR model: the power of 
the Third Principle to draw resources away from disputes when the third-
party actor allocation becomes intolerably high. 
The most famous Supreme Court case of all, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,83 articulated grand principles of the Equal Protection Clause, yet it 
postponed consideration of the knotty question of "appropriate relief,84-
that is, how actual human beings could secure the benefits of those grand 
principles. Brown II,85 decided the following year, sought to answer this 
question by, in its famous words, holding that courts should "retain jurisdic-
tion" and conduct proceedings that were "necessary and proper to admit 
80. Ver Steegh, supra note 77, at 167. As with landlord-tenant cases, see supra text accompanying 
note 49, the presence of an attorney vastly increases the chances that such clients will be successful. See, 
e.g., Murphy, supra note 77, at 511 (empirical study demonstrated "that having an attorney substantially 
increased the rate of success in obtaining a protection order"). This last study also notes the troubling 
truth that often the quality of lawyers who were affordable to battered women were not only abysmal, 
but, in some instances. such lawyers would ''push women into inappropriate arrangements with their 
barterers or even ... pressure women into giving up." Cuthbert et a!., supra note 79, at 69. 
81. Rhode, supra note 10, at 1793. See. also Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in 
Divorce Settlement Negotiations, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 931, 937 (1997) ("[J]udges pay only cursory 
attention to the actual provisions of divorce agreements."). 
82. For a fascinating treatment of what follows, albeit from a somewhat different perspective. see 
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 55-77 (2000). 
83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
84. Brown. 347 U.S. at 495. 
85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown If), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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[students] to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all 
deliberate speed.,,86 
In order to place the Brown line in an RDR context-something that 
might be a bit of a challenge in light of the sheer familiarity of these cases 
and the way they are usually analyzed-the plaintiffs in Brown and Brown 
II were not low-resource; rather, they were what I have called "values dis-
putants.,,87 While, of course, individuals affected by these decisions (and 
the named plaintiffs themselves) were mostly low-income, the aggregation 
of such claims into "test cases" and the involvement of higher resource 
groups and individuals who shared the values at stake generated sufficient 
legal services muscle to warrant the third-party actor treatment these cases 
received. In other words, plaintiffs in these cases had substantial enough 
resources that, under the Second Principle, they could purchase enough le-
gal services under the First Principle to have a meaningful chance of suc-
cess. 
That said, Brown II did usher in an extraordinary allocation of third-
party actor RDR that would seem to have begun to stretch the legal ser-
vices/third-party actor nexus of the Third Principle. The federal courts, for 
the most part, did their best to achieve desegregation with frustrating results. 
The post-Brown II period was punctuated with opinions from an increas-
ingly restive Supreme Court because actual results continued to evade the 
COurtS.88 This line culminated in 1971 with Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,89 which detailed devices courts could 
employ to achieve the remedies the Court had sought to achieve some sev-
enteen years earlier.9o At the risk of some simplification, Swann repre-
sented the high-water mark of total RDR allocation in desegregation cases. 
While the details of the doctrinal modifications after Swann are not nec-
essary to an RDR analysis, a summary of the Supreme Court's shift is rele-
vant: In the end, "[n]o longer impatient about how long it was taking state 
authorities to comply with judicial desegregation orders, the Court now be-
gan to express impatience with the duration of the desegregation orders 
themselves.,,91 In other words, in RDR terms, the third-party allocation be-
gan to grow too large; courts were expending too much time and money 
regardless of whether the principles underlying Brown and Brown II were 
being vindicated. This led the Supreme Court in Freeman v. Pitts92 and 
Missouri v. Jenkins93 to an utter retreat, whereby, for all practical purposes, 
86. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301. 
87. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
88. For a summary of these decisions, see AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 82, at 55-56. 
89. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
90. These devices included busing and "a frank-and sometimes drastic-gerrymandering of 
school districts and attendance zones." Swann, 402 U.S. at 27. 
91. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 82, at 58 (emphasis added). 
92. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
93. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
118 The Journal of the Legal Profession [Vol. 29 
continuing federal jurisdiction in desegregation cases ended, and ended is 
where it remains today. 
There are, of course, many explanations of why Brown became close to 
a dead letter, from the jurisprudential, to the sociological, to the political. 
All of these are critical to understanding these shifts. From an RDR per-
spective, the magnitude of third-actor allocation became too great to justify 
continuing federal involvement even when a relatively high-resource set of 
value disputants was pursuing these cases. Or, to put it somewhat differ-
ently, it did not matter that local authorities refused to adhere to core princi-
ples of the Fourteenth Amendment: It simply cost too much in terms of 
judicial resources to care. 
C. Alternative Dispute Resolutionfor the Masses: Hierarchies Emergent 
The emergence of ADR and especially mediation, while full of promise 
of empowerment for disputants, has, by all accounts, largely replicated the 
hierarchies that exist for traditional adjudication. 
There has emerged an elite and relatively closed group of lawyers, me-
diators, courts, and disputants who together attract prodigious amounts of 
RDR.94 In this world, the promise of ADR rings true; it furnishes a true 
alternative to litigation, albeit to the elite forms of litigation traditionally 
practiced in the federal courts. And for the rest? The mass justice of low-
income courts and "a parallel (and rather sloppy) justice system dominated 
by a potluck of court-appointed neutrals.,,95 Indeed in some instances, this 
parallel is striking; one day in Boston's Housing Court's mediation pro-
gram, an observer saw seventy people waiting to be ushered into five me-
diation rooms~vidently, a fairly typical number.96 One Boston attorney 
characterized this mediation program as "a fast way for landlords to get 
their tenants evicted.'.97 
Interestingly, there has not emerged something akin to what has hap-
pened in education: an elite private school world for the affluent (analogous 
to mediation), and an underfunded, under-resourced public education world 
94. See Ganhy, supra note 39, at 931-33. An advertisement from the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation offers some flavor of the elite, necessarily commercial segment of the ADR market. A man in a 
business suit and office setting has the following quote printed above his picture: "I want a neutral who 
knows both my industry and the rules-inside and out." The copy is as follows: 
There's ADR. And then there's AAA. At the American Arbitration Association, we recog-
nize outstanding neutrals are essential to successful dispute resolution. AAA neutrals are not 
only distinguished by their industry-specific expertise, they're also the only ones in their pro-
fession who have received mandatory training on our rules and their proper use and enforce-
ment. When combined with AAA case managers who have been trained to keep things mov-
ing, panies benefit from a faster, more predictable process. To find out more about working 
with the ADR provider who sets the standards others follow contact us at .... 
Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 90 A.B.A. J., Apr. 2004, at 5, 5. 
95. Garthy. supra note 39. at 932. 
96. Zimmerman. supra note 45, at 196. Whether such a scene could be legitimately characterized 
as mediation is highly questionable. 
97. ld. at 197. 
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for everyone else (analogous to adjudication in the courts). Rather, there 
are two worlds, each of which, in tum, has two sub-worlds within it. High-
resource disputants have access to both elite courts and elite mediators and 
the ability to choose between them. Low-resource disputants are forced into 
overburdened and underfunded courts or overburdened and underfunded 
mediation programs and, often, have not even the ability to choose between 
whatever appears to be the lesser of two evils. This is because so-called 
mandatory mediation-an increasingly common phenomenon-is virtually 
always limited to matters involving low-income disputants.98 
To pause briefly on the mandatory mediation issue, there is no public 
policy reason why mandatory mediation should be limited to low-income 
litigants. Indeed, it would make all the sense in the world to send large or-
ganizations and their legal teams to mediation to clear dockets of the explo-
sions of motions and discovery disputes such cases generate. This would 
make room for the really important matters--cases involving the welfare of 
individuals. From a moral or public policy point of view, this would make 
eminent sense. But when public policy and morality face RDR theory, there 
is no contest; it is invariably a rout, and RDR theory always wins in this as 
in all matters relating to dispute resolution. 
In sum, just as there are forms of the practice of law that are of a lower 
status within the legal profession-the sorts of volume practice alluded to 
earlier99 being a prime example-there is evidence to suggest that there is 
now "a place for relatively marginal members of the legal profession to be 
deputized as mediators" in the sorts of cases judges do not want to handle, 
which tend to be, unsurprisingly, cases formerly subjected to mass jus-
tice. loo Moreover, in similar fashion to the emergence of elite law firms, 
there are now elite ADR frrms lOl who associate with highly trained neutrals 
yet, in an utterly unsurprising yet dispiriting trend, do not handle mass jus-
tice cases because it is not in their economic interest to do SO.102 In the ab-
sence of substantial legal services RDR, there is no incentive to allocate 
98. Most of these mandatory mediation programs are for family law cases in which the vast major-
ity of disputants are low-income, although, of course, mandatory mediation does sometimes apply to 
affluent spouses who are getting divorced. See Zimmerman, supra note 45, at 182. Mandatory media-
tion is something of a misnomer in that it means parties must mediate before seeking judicial redress; it 
would be unconstitutional if judicial redress was completely precluded. Nevertheless, the effect of such 
programs-particularly for low-income disputants-is constructively the same, because there is usually 
intense pressure to resolve matters in mediation. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the 
Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. u. L.Q. 47, 60-62 (1996); Andrea G. Gagnon, Ending Man-
datory Divorce Mediation for Battered Women, 16 HARv. WOMEN'S L.I. 272,281 (1991) (noting that 
mediators are pressured by judges to settle cases and that mediators believe that their job performance is 
evaluated based on their percentage of cases settled). 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
100. Garthy, supra note 39, at 938,949. Some have argued that judges affirmatively want to handle 
business disputes involving large sums of money because this will allow for employment after leaving 
the bench in the highly lucrative ADR market for individuals to mediate and arbitrate such disputes. Id. 
at 941-43. 
101. These include JAMS and the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution. 
102. Zimmerman, supra note 45, at 193 ("Because there is little to no money in mediating land-
lord/tenant disputes, few mediators do this type of work."); Garthy, supra note 39, at 938. 
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substantial third-party actor RDR. Thus, the market siphons off many of the 
best mediators, leaving those desperately in need with little or nothing. 103 
D. A Graphic Summary 
Table 1 displays the Principles of RDR in tabular form by setting forth 
how different categories of cases generate different "RDR Profiles." 
TABLE 1 
RDR PROFILES OF COMMON DISPUTES 
Disputes Among High-Resource Parties 
Resource Level of Parties: High 
RDR Allocated to Legal Representation: High 
RDR Allocated to Third-Party Actors: High 
Examples: Commercial disputes among business organizations; civil 
matters involving affluent parties; administrative proceedings involv-
ing high-resource commercial entities. 
Disputes Between High-Resource Parties and Low-Resource Parties 
Resource Levels of Parties: High against low 
RDR Allocated to Legal Representation: Low (or non-existent for pro 
se litigants) 
RDR Allocated to Third-Party Actors: Low 
Examples: Landlord-tenant disputes; debt collections cases; bank-
ruptcy. 
Disputes Between Government and Low-Resource Parties 
Resource Level of Parties: Low 
RDR Allocated to Legal Representation: Low (or non-existent for pro 
se litigants) 
RDR Allocated to Third-Party Actors: Low 
Examples: Administrative and judicial hearings involving government 
benefits; immigration cases. 
Disputes Among Low-Resource Parties 
Resource Level of Parties: Low 
RDR Allocated to Legal Representation: Low (or non-existent for pro 
se litigants) 
RDR Allocated to Third-Party Actors: Low 
Examples: Family law cases involving low-income couples and children. 
103. In a sure sign that the world of mediators is beginning to mirror the world of adjudication, the 
ABA has begun to call for successful ADR practitioners to engage in pro bono mediation on behalf of 
underserved populations. Zimmerman, supra note 45, at 187. The results will likely be as unsuccessful 
as pro bono initiatives among the private bar. See infra text accompanying notes 177--81. 
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How do we know the accuracy of these profiles? Taking solely the le-
gal representation component of the resources of dispute resolution, about 
one percent of lawyers are working as legal aid lawyers or public defenders, 
and revenues of such organizations are less than one percent of the total 
revenues of legal services nationwide. 104 As a result, when the interests of a 
high-resource disputant are at risk, such as in commercial disputes or when 
an organization or individual has a dispute with a governmental agency, the 
system allocates prodigious amounts of dispute resolution resources. There 
are multiple lawyers, logistical support for the lawyers, the expenditure of 
decision-maker time and attention for these types of cases. In contrast, 
when the interests of low-resource disputants are at stake, there almost cer-
tainly will be no lawyer or, at best, an overwhelmingly overworked, albeit 
dedicated, public interest lawyer,105 and only a minimal expenditure of judi-
cial time and resources. Moreover, the additional resources required to 
prosecute appeals render them virtually the exclusive domain of resourced 
litigants. 
The end result: Low-resource disputants grievously suffer. First, such 
disputants are left with less access to legal services: As more and more 
legal services are focused on commercial disputes which are, by definition, 
the virtually exclusive domain of high-resource commercial interests, most 
disputants are priced out of obtaining the services of this corps of lawyers 
or, in many instances, of any legal services at all. The balance of the pro-
fession must make a living through a volume practice, with the end result 
being that the quality of legal services in these other cases-if obtainable at 
all-suffers accordingly. Second, given that there is usually a fixed amount 
of resources available to third-party actors, the increasing demands placed 
on decision-makers in a small subset of cases limits the amount of time and 
effort such decision-makers can spend on everything else. This generates 
the ever-increasing zeal for judicial economy with such zeal directed almost 
exclusively at the "everything else" cases. 106 This also generates mecha-
nisms that divert cases involving low-income disputants away from fora 
where cases involving higher-resourced disputants are resolved. 107 This end 
result is the creation and administration of mass justice courts and agencies. 
V. RATIONALIZATIONS AND ENABLERS 
The discourse of law and lawyers contributes to inequities in RDR allo-
cations by enabling Ll}em and rationalizing them through misleadingly ncu-
104. Hadfield, supra note 12, at 960. 
105. Isolated instances of pro bono representation do little to change this picture. See infra text 
accompanying notes 177-81. 
106. See infra text accompanying noles 130-34. 
107. See infra text accompanying notes 135-51. 
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tral and truthful assumptions and mechanisms that are, in fact, neither neu-
tral nor truthful. 
A. Rationalizations 
1. Complexity 
The extraordinary inequalities and hierarchies that stratify the profes-
sion and, as a result, the legal representation component of RDR are so ob-
vious that common sense (and self-justification for the higher end elements 
of the profession) demand some sort of explanation. That explanation is 
remarkably pervasive and rarely questioned, even among critics of the cur-
rent system. The explanation is that business litigation demands more intel-
ligence and resources because it is more complex. The unspoken (and 
sometimes spoken) corollary is that in a free market, it is justifiable that 
business lawyers, particularly at large firms, command high fees, because 
the challenges of their work demand it. This assumption is false. 
More lawyers learn about the complexities of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, the Tax Code, securities regulation, and business organizations be-
cause that is what the market demands; clients who have resources require 
expertise in these areas. Faced with heavily litigated matters that are pep-
pered with lavish motion and discovery practices propounded by large legal 
teams retained by high-resource commercial entities, judges respond with 
numerous decisions which make their way into legal reporters to be, in tum, 
researched and cited by future legal teams retained by high-resource com-
mercial entities for similar cases. Legal publishers oblige with treatises and 
practice guides designed to make sense of this increasingly intricate array of 
authorities and precedent. The succeeding vortex not only generates inten-
sifying and self-fulfilling complexity, but it also acts to further justify the 
need for the best legal talent and the bulk of dispute resolution resources to 
focus on commercial matters. 
In contrast, while clients without resources must grapple with a range of 
intensely complex legal problems, law schools tend not to focus on these 
issues because practicing lawyers tend not to focus on them; there is no 
money to be made in doing so. The marketplace, unsurprisingly, influences 
law school curricula as much as the specialties of the practicing bar. 108 
While these processes and consequences generate assumptions about 
what is or is not legally complex, the unacknowledged leap that almost in-
variably takes place is that legal issues facing low-income disputants-if 
108. Interestingly, a narrow exception to this picture involves high·profile constitutional litigation, 
such as cases involving the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process Clause. 
Given the attention paid to these areas by high-profile academics and, of course, the United States Su-
preme Court, elite firms often consider such matters worthy of their expertise and participation. Never-
theless, many of these issues, while, of course, of great significance, are not high on the list of issues for 
those in poverty; free speech matters little in the face of inadequate health care. childcare, education, or 
shelter. 
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they are acknowledged as worthy of attention at all-are simple, straight-
forward, and, in a word that is particularly offensive in this context, rou-
tine. 109 There is, conversely, a universal truth that commercial transactions 
and disputes surrounding them are necessarily and inherently more complex 
and challenging than other types of practice, including, of course, poverty 
law. 110 
This assumption is verifiably false for three reasons. First, poverty law 
currently embodies an enormously complex and intricate web of laws and 
regulations. To take one of many examples, any aspiring or practicing pov-
erty lawyer well knows that the web of public benefit programs presents an 
overwhelming tangle of decisional, statutory, and regulatory provisions that 
easily rival in complexity the most mind-numbing of commercial law is-
sues. lll Moreover, these public benefits issues generate a bewildering array 
of substantive issues--common-Iaw, statutory, regulatory, constitutional-
for the creative lawyer, if only a lawyer takes the time to conduct an in-
depth analysis of them. 112 The continuing flux in this area, given the wel-
fare reform of recent years, only intensifies the confusion. Such extraordi-
narily complex matters could easily occupy teams of law firm associates if 
only someone (or something) were willing to pay a law firm to make it 
worth its while to do so, which, of course, there is not. 113 
Public benefits law is not all unique in its complexity. Many other areas 
of poverty law are fiendishly complex, including public and subsidized 
housing, 114 landlord-tenant,115 consumer cases, 116 and prisoner civil rights 
cases. 117 
109. Garthy, supra note 39, at 943 ("[L]arge business cases inside or outside the courts are consid-
ered the most challenging and attract the best lawyers .... "). The partner who criticized me leaving 
"cutting edge legal work" in favor of public interest work employed this complexity rationale. See supra 
text accompanying note 6. 
11 O. Indeed, in my research for this Article, I have encountered untold examples of the complexity 
assumption; I have not encountered a single challenge to it. See infra text accompanying notes 126-29. 
Ill. See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 
CAL. L. REv. 569 (2001). 
112. See id. at 602-40 (exploring possible claims by welfare beneficiaries subjected to privatized 
welfare and including state and federal constitutional issues, statutory issues, regulatory issues, and 
potential common-law claims). 
113. Similarly, given that public benefits law is not a lucrative source of business for lawyers, there 
is a dearth of comprehensive public benefits treatises except in the few areas where a client pool of 
relative affluence consults lawyers in this area, such as in elder law practices. 
114. For a taste of the complexity in this area, see HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS: TENANTS' RIGHTS 
(3d ed. 2004). Issues in this area include the bewildering array of Section 8 programs, rules relating to 
tenant applications, the determination of rents, required lease provisions, grievance procedures prior to 
the initiation of eviction proceedings. and guidelines regarding tenant associations. What makes t.'lis 
area particularly challenging is that this array of federal statutory and regulatory law must be construed 
in conjunction with state statutes, rules, and regulations regarding real property, landlord-tenant rela-
tions, civil procedure, and the operation of public housing authorities. 
115. Landlord-tenant is a classic instance of what appears simple from a distance is often complex 
when actually litigated, that is, treated as if it were not part of mass justice. Apart from the overlay of 
issues generated when tenants live in public or subsidized housing, see supra note 114, in some jurisdic-
tions, particularly New York, rent regulations have made landlord-tenant law, in the words of one com-
mentator, of "Einsteinian complexities." Stephen Dobkin, Confiscating Reality: The Illusion of Con-
trols in the Big Apple, 54 BROOK L. REv. 1249, 1257 (1989). For a description ofthe tangle of overlap-
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Second, there is no question that a massive repository of judicial deci-
sions, legislative history, regulatory authority, and expert commentary gov-
erning commercial disputes warrants specialized knowledge and extensive 
experience to master. It is, however, illogical to assume that this arises 
from an inherent complexity as to the underlying disputes; it is just as likely 
the result of the riches of legal and decisional resources-which have them-
selves been generated by market forces-that are lavished on such dis-
putes. IIS Indeed, it seems perfectly logical that the large commercial inter-
ests who usually are plaintiffs in mass justice cases want them to be simple 
and routine, or at least want those cases to appear that way, because com-
plexity breeds individualized adjudication, which will cost them more in 
terms of legal services, which is the enemy of mass adjudication. Third-
party actors in mass adjudication cases agree. These players, under the 
grand nomenclature of the "administration of justice," similarly want-
indeed need-these matters to be routine; complexity is hardly a welcome 
ingredient when processing thousands of cases per day with minimal proc-
ess. 
A third fallacy of the complexity rationale involves the meaning of 
complexity itself. Law school and, to a certain extent, the public have long 
characterized the law as a learned profession, with the learning having to do 
with mastering a set of legal principles or, in the usual term, "doctrine." 
The law school curriculum has long adhered to this emphasis on doctrine-
an emphasis that has remained largely unabated since the time of Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell. 1I9 While, as I have said, doctrinal issues facing 
ping laws and regulations, see G. Samuel Zucker, Insurance for Eviction without Cause: A Middle Path 
for Tenant Tenure Rights and a New Remedy for Retaliatory Eviction, 28 URB. LAWYER 113, 117 n.16 
(1996). Rent regulation, of course, is not only a New York phenomenon but exists in many municipali-
ties and states. See generally Jane Drummey, A Comparison of the Changing Legal Definition of Family 
in Succession Rights to Rent Regulated Housing in the United States and Great Britain, 17 BROOK L. 
REV. 123 (1991). 
116. The National Consumer Law Center publishes thirteen expansive volumes in its Consumer 
Credit and Sales Legal Practice Series. Among the complex array of statutes typically implicated by so-
called simple or routine collections cases include the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 
U.S.CA §§ 1601-1618 (2004), the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667(f) (2004) 
(induding the all-important regulatory glosses, especially as embodied in Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. Part 
226)), the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1681-1681(u) (2004), the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 2301-2312 (2004), a daunting array of federal and state statutes that address unfair 
and deceptive acts and practices, common-law claims and counterclaims in torts such as misrepresenta-
tion and fraud, as well as the advantages, disadvantages, procedures and substantive law of consumer 
bankruptcy. Of course, as I note elsewhere, simple collections cases also often involve public benefits 
issues and housing issues (whether it be public or subsidized housing, private-landlord tenant disputes, 
or legal issues surrounding homeownership, induding tax and mortgage foreclosures). 
117. See, e.g., David C. Leven, Justice for the Forgotten and Despised, 16 TOURO L. REv. I, 11 
(1999) (noting prisoner's civil rights cases "require expertise that few lawyers have"). 
118. Marc Galanter took note of this process in 1974, albeit using different terms and a different 
litigation terrain, when he noted that when repeat players sue repeat players, "we might expect that there 
would be heavy expenditure on rule-development, many appeals, and rapid and elaborate development 
of the doctrinal law." Galanter, supra note 18, at 112-13. 
119. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 
1980s (1983). I have offered a critique of this tendency in a different context in Robert Rubinson. Atror-
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low-income disputants match or exceed the complexity of business disputes, 
the complexity of poverty law cases goes well beyond doctrine. Poverty 
breeds lives brimming with interlocking social and legal problems, includ-
ing landlord-tenant, family law (including a higher percentage of domestic 
violence and failures to pay child support), consumer (including possible 
bankruptcy), medical benefits (including the availability of prenatal, pediat-
ric, mental health assistance, or nursing home care under Medicaid or a 
patchwork of State-funded programs), subsistence benefits (including mod-
est, albeit critical, housing subsidies, food stamps, utility assistance, and the 
crazy quilt of cash assistance programs that have arisen in the wake of fed-
eral welfare reform), and immigration. These legal programs arise in the 
context of social ills bred by poverty: substance abuse, unsafe housing, the 
lack of medical insurance, crime, inadequate public education, and child-
care, to name a few. As any public interest lawyer will say after a week on 
the job, complex does not begin to describe the range of challenges gener-
ated by this type of practice. 120 
All of this said, the "complexity rationale" is, in the end, utterly beside 
the point. Even if mass justice cases are simple or routine-which they are 
not-this offers no food to the hungry or shelter to the homeless. A legal 
system with any measure of integrity must allocate sufficient resources for 
matters where the stakes are high-and matters of subsistence, life, and 
death surely fall into this category. The fallacies of the complexity rationale 
add ajarring, almost sickening quality to the persistent inequities in allocat-
ing dispute resolution resources. 
2. "Stakes" 
In addition to the complexity rationale, popular and professional con-
ceptions of what is at "stake" in a given dispute also rationalize disparate 
allocations of RDR. 121 
Whatever is being disputed is virtually always of some importance to 
the disputants themselves. If it were otherwise, it would not be worth dis-
puting. For reasons psychological or otherwise, this vision of consequence 
extends even to matters that would be deemed trivial by virtually all outside 
ney Fact·Finding, Ethical Decision-Making and the Methodology of Law, 45 ST. LoUIS U. LJ. 1185 
(2001). 
120. In conlrasllo tho: prevailing docmnai focus in iegai education, scholars who write from a clini-
cal perspective have generated a body of scholarship that takes such non-doctrinal complexity seriously. 
For some notable examples, see, e.g., Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and 
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G .• 38 BUFF. L. REV. I (1990); Gary L. Blasi. What Law-
yers Know: Lawyering Expertise. Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory. 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
313 (1995); AMSTERDAM & BRUNER. supra note 82. 
121. Another consequence of "high-stakes" cases is a popular misconception about the quality of the 
advocacy and decision-making available to the vast majority of individuals in non-high-stakes cases. 
See Rhode. supra note 10. at 1790. 
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observers, such as small claims (I mean this in the procedural sense) of no 
great financial import to the litigants. 122 
But this does not get us anywhere in terms of justifying disparate RDR 
allocations. Rather, RDR theory promotes the perspective of only certain 
disputants as more important than others. A collections case for an unpaid 
bill of $3,000 is hardly high-stakes to a large medical provider; the stakes 
only become high when such claims are viewed in the aggregate. Similarly, 
large landlords hold numerous properties; individual claims for unpaid rent 
are of modest interest, while, in the aggregate, the landlord makes a profit 
by collecting rent and evicting those who do not pay. The interest of the 
plaintiff in these instances, then, is to minimize the cost of litigating each 
claim, thus serving what is really at stake-the rapid, inexpensive adjudica-
tion of large numbers of cases which reach significance only in the aggre-
gate. 
Of course, from the perspective of the debtor struggling to subsist on 
minimal wages or government benefits, a $3,000 judgment and succeeding 
garnishment of meager wages compromise her ability to survive with a 
modicum of dignity or, in some cases, to survive at all. The problem, of 
course, is that the judicial system, controlled by RDR theory, recognizes the 
provider's stakes as legitimate by administering mass justice with minimal 
process in a way that virtually guarantees success in the aggregate to the 
higher-resourced party.123 The debtor's or tenant's interest-far greater 
from virtually any moral or ethical perspective-is minimized. 
Apart from participants, another class of individuals who conceive of 
stakes in disputes is non-participant observers. These fall into two classes: 
academics and the public. To many academics, disputes that matter are 
those that generate reported decisions by judges and that address engaging 
or controversial aspects of the law. Decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, by definition, fall into this category. Of greatest interest of all are 
constitutional issues, particularly those with political or values content, such 
as cases involving abortion, First Amendment, Equal Protection, and so 
forth. This is not to say, of course, that there is no academic attention fo-
cused on other areas, such as the representation of clients or the provision of 
legal services; there plainly is, but the broad law-focused characterization 1 
offer describes the vast bulk of pedagogical and scholarly interest of the 
legal academy. 
From the perspective of the observing public, at least as reflected 
through popular media,124 matters of consequence tend to involve celebrities 
122. For a discussion of "small claims" cases from a jurisdictional perspective, see infra the text 
accompanying notes 135-51. 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49. 
124. It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in the simmering issues surrounding the extent 
to which popular media reflects what interests the public or influences what is of interest to the public. 
As with most "chicken-egg" arguments, the answer is, almost certainly, that both influence and mutually 
reinforce the other. In any event, there is no question that the media, if nothing else, are experts at cov-
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or persons otherwise of note, such as wealthy corporate executives who are 
embroiled in legal entanglements of some sort or non-public figures accused 
of criminal acts that are particularly heinous or shocking. 125 Because of the 
compelling morality-play quality of criminal cases, relatively few civil 
cases reach the hysterical level of attention paid to celebrity criminal pro-
ceedings. The sole consistent exception involves divorcing celebrities and 
public figures. The public, through the media, lavish extraordinary attention 
on such matters. 
The perspective of the legal profession, including judges, is perhaps 
toughest to define because the legal profession is comprised of numerous 
subgroups based on affluence, organizational model (as in a large firm ver-
sus a solo practitioner), practice area, and geography. That said, to the ex-
tent the Model Rules of Professional Conduct represent some sort of con-
sensus, albeit not one to which all attorneys would ascribe, the following 
offers some clues: 
Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and 
analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of 
methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practi-
tioners . . .. The required attention and preparation are determined 
in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transac-
tions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of 
lesser complexity and consequence. 126 
This quote reveals that "major litigation" and "complex transactions" 
are high-stakes. The conjunction of "complexity" and "consequence" hints 
that the two are linked; that is, "transactions" which are "complex" tend to 
be of greater consequence. 
The assumptions underlying this quote are pervasive,127 particularly 
since it just so happens that the higher-prestige segments of the legal profes-
sion tend to focus on matters involving so-called complex transactions. 128 
ering matters that draw popular attention. and it is in this respect that consideration of what the media 
covers offers at least a rough sense of what matters to the public-at-Iarge. 
125. The appearance of such things on the radar screen of popular culture appears to be expressed by 
the following equation: S (star power) x T (tawdriness of legal problem) = I (popular media radar screen 
intensity). Thus, a big star (large S) might have an otherwise modest or unremarkable legal predicament 
(low T) yet make the news. A modest or forgotten star (low S) might have an otherwise shocking or 
tawdry legal predicament (high T) and thus make the news. On occasion, an otherwise anonymous 
member of the public (an S that approaches 0, but the equation works only if every human being is 
assigned some quantity for S, even if vanishingly smail) might be accused of spectacularly gruesome or 
brutal acts (exceptionally high T) and thus make the news. Of course. the real cultural earthquakes 
happen when S and T are both high. Examples should come immediately to mind. 
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUcrR. 1.1 cmt. 5 (2003) (emphasis added). 
127. Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, has alluded to how cases of "major importance," such as 
"major commercial litigation," were more common in the federal courts in 1960 than in succeeding 
decades. Galanter, supra note 40, at 921-22, 944. Apart from the simple inaccuracy of this account, see 
supra text accompanying notes 39-40, Justice Scalia conflates "importance" with "high-stakes" com-
mercial cases-a conflation that is extraordinarily common among judges and the practicing bar. 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14. 
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In this regard, the obliviousness of the public-at-large to most complex and 
sophisticated business litigationl29 does not matter, since elite firms hold 
disproportionate influence in defining high-stakes cases among the practic-
ing bar. 
At the risk of valuing generalization over nuance, the perspectives of 
these groups of participants and observers, while not overlapping in all par-
ticulars, do generate aggregations of what most of the public, academia, 
practitioners, and judges view as high-stakes cases. The following lists mat-
ters that attract both substantial attention and, not coincidentally, substantial 
RDR: 
• Commercial disputes with substantial amounts of money at 
stake. 
• "Major litigation." Major litigation would ordinarily include 
high-profile civil litigation that involves significant resources or 
matters of public policy or both, such as the Microsoft antitrust case 
or the tobacco litigation. 
• Matters involving novel or controversial questions of law, usu-
ally of constitutional dimension, and including most cases decided 
by the United States Supreme Court. 
• Matters involving public figures, such as politicians and espe-
cially celebrities, or those who are accused of spectacularly grue-
some or brutal acts. 
This list is another way of identifying matters that attract prodigious 
amounts of RDR. Each has an RDR profile-high legal representation re-
sources that generate high third-party actor resources-which are fully con-
sistent with the operation of RDR theory. 
What is missing from these high-stakes cases are the legions of low-
income disputants engaged in disputes where the well-being of children, 
food and shelter, life and death, are at stake. 
3. Judicial Economy 
It is a commonplace that courts strive for "judicial economy." This 
serves to justify a whole range of phenomena: the enthusiasm with which 
129. While rare, there are occasions where "business litigation" does become the subject of public 
attention. This is often because of the mammoth economic impact of a few cases (such as the Pennzoil 
litigation) or the glamour or interest associated with a particular enterprise (such as the Microsoft anti-
trust litigation). 
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courts enforce agreements to arbitrate,130 the embrace of mediation as an 
alternative to adjudication, 131 the limitation of judicial intervention to "ac-
tual cases and controversies,,,I32 and untold numbers of procedural and sub-
stantive decisions which, if decided otherwise, would impose greater bur-
dens on an already overburdened judiciary. 
The best way to summarize how the idea of judicial economy rational-
izes RDR allocations is as follows: Judicial economy matters most when 
disputes matter least. Indeed, RDR allocations are at their most lavish when 
disputes, in fact, matter least but just appear to matter most because RDR 
theory could not operate legitimately otherwise. 
From the perspective of the cold calculations of RDR theory, therefore, 
disputes matter least when, under the Third Principle, there are few or no 
legal services resources at play. And, sure enough, these just happen to be 
the areas where mass justice-the most "efficient" of all courts--comes into 
being. 133 Such efficiency invariably vindicates the claims of high-resource 
parties. Apart from the all-powerful RDR theory influence, there is nothing 
inherent in the nature of dispute resolution that would prevent efficient vin-
dication of the rights of the low-resourced as against the high-resourced. As 
Richard Abel has trenchantly observed, "[i]t is simply untrue that we cannot 
design and operate a court that efficiently enforces a high volume of rights: 
Look at the way housing courts process evictions or small claims courts 
attach wages to pay debts!,,134 
In any event, to ask a question that has been a recurrent refrain of this 
Article: Should efficiency matter when shelter, food, and life are at stake? 
B. Enablers 
1. Jurisdiction 
Apart from generating the series of rarely challenged (or even recog-
nized) assumptions that I have been describing, RDR theory operates 
through the rules of subject matter jurisdiction. Presented to first-year law 
students as bland, technical principles elaborated through (as is most every-
thing else in law school) appellate decisions, their role is much more sinister 
when considering access to justice issues. If such rules were people, they 
would be the hatchet men of RDR theory. 
130. See. e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468. 475-76 (1989) (collecting authori-
ties about ''federal policy favoring arbitration"). 
131. See infra text accompanying note 224. 
132. See, e.g., Lea Brilmeyer, The Jurisprudence of Article 1Il: Perspectives on the "Case" or 
"Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979). 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49, 76-81. 
134. Richard Abel, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 8 (Richard Abel ed., 1982). 
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a. State Courts 
State courts divert cases to different fora based primarily on the 
"amount in controversy.,,135 The less the amount in controversy, the more 
likely a rule will direct a case into a forum with fewer procedural safe-
guards, more congested dockets, and less qualified judges. 
The reasoning behind this is so natural that it is almost not worth repeat-
ing. Cases with modest amounts in controversy have lower stakes, are sim-
pler, and, thus, can and should be adjudicated more swiftly.136 Mixing them 
in with major litigation dilutes the ability of judges to focus on these more 
important matters and thus hampers judicial efficiency. Moreover, there are 
considerably more pro se litigants in such low stakes fora, and burdening 
them with such technicalities as the rules of evidence and discovery merely 
adds expense, delay, and inefficiency in adjudication. 
In light of my previous discussion, each of these rarely questioned justi-
fications is more than questionable. Many "simple cases" are simple only 
because there are no attorneys available with the time and resources to vig-
orously contest them. The "simplified procedures" of such fora jettison 
activities that are approached with the utmost seriousness and vigor in full 
adjudication. Imagine the hue and cry (and the loss of billable hours) if the 
time and expense of discovery and the delay generated by application of the 
rules of evidence led to their abolition in all adjudication! 
Most troubling of all is the stakes rationale. In a society of even re-
motely just distribution of wealth, where $1 to Bill Gates is roughly equiva-
lent to $1 to the working poor, as so eloquently described by Barbara Ehren-
reich,137 there might be some rough justice in allocating RDR based on the 
amount in controversy. As it stands now, the amount in controversy stan-
dard, despite its veneer of objectivity, is anything but; it devalues the stakes 
of disputants of modest or no means even though their cases often implicate 
their ability to subsist and survive with a modicum of dignity. 
What such rules really do is operationalize RDR theory. The amount in 
controversy stands well for the likely legal services RDR allocation at play 
in a given dispute. So RDR theory gets down to business: The larger the 
135. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 37, at IO (referring to how "state 
trial court systems are organized into courts of general and limited jurisdiction," with the civil docket of 
the latter "primarily small claims cases"). In the interests of technical accuracy, sometimes these diver-
sions are by administrative fiat to particular "parts" of an existing court and, thus, not a rule of "subject 
matter jurisdiction." This difference is utterly irrelevant to a disputant who still physically is forced to 
adjudicate a defense (or, more rarely, a claim) in a specific forum and does not care (or, much more 
likely, does not know) that the forcing can or is being done through a state constitution, statute, or "rule" 
of an administrator of the court system. For both a graphic description of an administratively created 
"court" that purportedly limited jurisdiction to certain landlord-tenant claims and a rare appellate court's 
strongly-worded rejoinder that such a jurisdictionally limited court could not exist without legislative 
authority, see generally Williams v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 760 A.2d 697 (2000). 
136. See Neal Kauder, National State Court Caseload Trends, 1984-1993, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, 
Aug. 1995, at I, I ("All states have at least one court of general jurisdiction, the highest trial court in the 
state, where ... high-stakes civil matters are handled.") (emphasis added). 
137. BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMEO: ON (NOT) GETTING By IN AMERICA (2001). 
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amount in controversy, the larger the legal services allocation, the larger the 
third-party actor allocation. Rules of subject matter jurisdiction skip the 
intervening steps and move straight from amount in controversy to third-
party allocation. Given the huge numbers and variety of cases involved, 
jurisdictional rules are remarkably effective at doing the job of implement-
ing RDR theory. Only the rare low-income disputant finds herself outside 
of her appointed place through some fluke of law or fact, and she often be-
comes the proverbial stranger in a bar in the Old West; she is run out of 
town with dispatch. 
b. The Federal Courts 
The jurisdictional rules of the federal judiciary reflect RDR theory as 
much as state courts do, albeit with distinctive twists. 
Despite the prestige accorded the federal judiciary and federal adjudica-
tion in general, federal courts handle only a tiny percentage of adjudication 
in the United States. 138 The primary bases of federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion-diversity and federal question-are constitutional in origin139 and are 
therefore artifacts of a very different time and place. That said, they serve 
today as an effective bar to this most exclusive and highly resourced of all 
fora to most low-income disputants. Apart from the occasional automobile 
accident case-matters hardly relished among the third-party actors of fed-
eral court who typically view themselves as above the seedy world of per-
sonal injury-most diversity cases involve business disputes because busi-
nesses, not individuals, tend to operate across state lines. 
As to federal question jurisdiction, most of the bread and butter poverty 
law issues-landlord-tenant and family law-are governed primarily by 
state law. While another huge category of cases--collections cases--often 
implicate federal consumer protections statutes, low-income disputants are 
invariably defendants, and it is fair to say that the last place a collections 
case plaintiff would likely file a case is in federal court. 
There are, however, three areas where the federal courts are forced to 
adjudicate substantial numbers of cases involving low-income disputants: 
prisoners' civil rights cases, social security appeals, and bankruptcy peti-
tions. As to the prisoner cases, the United States Supreme Court, as with 
school desegregation cases,14O has helped resolve the problem presented by 
this large docket by developing procedural and substantive law that is ex-
traordinarily harsh and unforgiving,141 and, thus, most of these cases can be 
138. Of the almost 100 million case filings in the United States in 2001, less than 3% were in the 
federal system. EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 37, at 13. 
139. U.S. CONST. Art. ill, § 1. 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 82-93. 
141. See. e.g., Melissa L. Koehn, The New American Caste System: The Supreme Court and Dis-
crimination Among Civil Rights Claimants, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 49, 51 (1999) ("Plaintiffs who are 
prisoners or who sue police officers generally confront an amazing thicket of procedural snarls which 
often prevent federal courts from hearing the merits of their claims. "J. 
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summarily dismissed. Congress has also contributed by passing the so-
called "Prison Litigation Reform Act,,142 which establishes filing fees and 
procedural restrictions designed to make these cases less likely to be filed 
and, if filed, more likely to be summarily dismissed. 143 Legal services re-
strictions and further cuts to prisoner legal services offices l44 force inmates 
to draft complaints themselves, with the result that even well-meaning 
judges and clerks cannot fathom whether a claim is meritorious or not, with, 
again, dismissal the inevitable result. 
In the case of Social Security Disability, only a tiny percentage of such 
cases reach federal court; the aptly-named administrative requirement of 
"exhaustion of administrative remedies,,145 insures that many years of time 
and effort are required to get to court, thus discouraging all but the most 
hardy and resilient of claimants. Even those who do make it then encounter 
formal and informal mechanisms that divert these cases to magistrates and 
establish streamlined procedures-yet another example of the stakes, com-
plexity, and judicial efficiency rationales at work in the service of RDR 
allocations. 146 And, of course, generations of law clerks and law students 
clerking in judges' chambers have cut their teeth on these cases: Most fed-
eraljudges view themselves as having more important matters to attend to. 
Finally, there remains the case of bankruptcy. Comprising almost fifty-
five percent of the federal court filings,147 federal district courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over bankruptcy petitions. 148 Congress created a separate 
unit of federal district courts to adjudicate bankruptcy cases. 149 Like family 
law cases, this forum is unusual in that it includes a mixture of a few high-
resource parties mixed in with large numbers of low-income or indigent 
parties. As RDR theory would suggest, low-income petitioners either can-
not afford representation or can afford only high-volume, low-quality repre-
sentation, with predictable results: They are accorded minimal process, 
with the result being large numbers of unnecessary filings, filings which are 
not made but should be, filings dismissed due to technical deficiencies, a 
failure to pursue adversarial proceedings for discharge of otherwise non-
142. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 132-66 (1996). 
143. For an overview of this "disgraceful piece of legislation" and its consequences, see Leven, 
supra note 117, at 14-16. 
144. The United State Supreme Court, as usual, has promoted this state of affairs. Bounds v. Smith, 
430 U.S. 817 (1977) (holding that prisoners have "meaningful access to courts" merely by having access 
to law libraries). The legal services restrictions prohibit recipients from "participat[ing] in any civil 
litigation on behalf of a person who is incarcerated in a Federal, State or local prison." 45 c.F.R. § 
1637.3 (2005). See generally Leven, supra note 117 (describing crises in providing access to justice for 
inmates). 
145. See JERRY I. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUR tiC LAW SYSTEM 
978-93 (5th ed. 2003). 
146. See Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 
24 GA. L. REV. 909,958-60 (1990) (detailing how large numbers of social security cases-viewed as 
"lesser work" by Article ill judges-are referred to magistrate judges). 
147. EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, supra note 37, at 13. 
148. 28 U.S.c. § 1334 (2000). 
149. 28 U.S.C. § lSI (2000). 
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dischargeable debts, and other consequences that petitioners who can afford 
high-quality, individualized representation do not suffer. 150 As predicted by 
the Third Principle, minimal third-party actor resources are accorded to 
these actors. 151 As a result, in practical operation for the vast majority of 
bankruptcy petitioners, bankruptcy court is a court of mass justice, federal-
style. 
2. Due Process and Equal Protection 
Do constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection limit 
the operation of the Principles of RDR? The short answer is-not a whit. 
Instead, at most, the veneer of these constitutional protections legitimizes 
otherwise appallingly inequitable circumstances. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,152 articu-
lated a balancing test in determining whether a set of procedures accord 
with constitutional requirements of due process: 
[T]he specific dictates of due process generally requires considera-
tion of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 153 
As is often true of balancing tests, there is minimal or no guidance as to 
which consideration should be given greater weight. 154 Filtered through 
RDR theory, though, the only factor that would come into play is the last-
the third-party actor allocation, which, in turn, is generated by the magni-
tude of legal services brought to bear in a dispute. Sure enough, that is pre-
cisely the case: The Mathews test has generated an overwhelming presump-
tion in favor of the constitutionality of whatever process has been put in 
place, whatever the stakes to the disputants. 155 
150. See Engler, supra note 26, at 2052-57 (collecting authorities on the increasing numbers of 
unrepresented litigants in bankruptcy court and characterizing the consequences for these litigants as 
"devastating"). 
!51. [d. at 2055-56. See also Susan Block-Lieb, A Comparison oj Pro Bunu Representation Pro-
grams/or Consumer Debtors, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 37 (1994). 
152. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
153. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 
154. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative 
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search 0/ a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 
28 (1976). 
155. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 ("[S]ubstantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of 
the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the proce-
dures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals."). 
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Consequently, RDR theory illuminates how the Mathews test misleads 
at two levels. First, Mathews purports to establish a baseline as to what 
constitutes constitutional due process through articulation of a complex set 
of factors. 156 In fact, however, only one of the Mathews factors-the last-
matters. As I have said, RDR would predict this because the other two fac-
tors-the private interests at stake and "the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of such interest"-are irrelevant to the allocation of RDR, while, conven-
iently, the third consideration implicates the Third Principle. Second, 
Mathews treats the third consideration as if it represented some sort of 
autonomous and thoughtful decision by the government as to the amount of 
process that would be appropriate-what Justice Powell called "the good 
faith judgment of individuals.,,157 This assumption is a sham; RDR theory 
holds that third-party allocations are contingent upon legal services alloca-
tions, which are, in turn, contingent upon the resources that disputants have 
at their command. Mathews fails to address the ultimate source of the mag-
nitude of process accorded disputants, and, un surprisingly, Mathews offers 
no meaningful way to attack whatever magnitude of process happens to be 
generated by considerations that Mathews fails to acknowledge. 158 
As to the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has long refused 
to hold that the poor constitute a suspect class. 159 Any equal protection at-
tack on the injustices generated by RDR theory must face that infamous 
dead end of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the "rational basis test." The end 
result is that there is not the remotest chance that any litigation challenging 
access to justice on equal protection grounds will succeed. 
In the end, principles of due process and equal protection as articulated 
by the Supreme Court are, at best, hollow. Indeed, they enable the unfet-




158. See id. A related dead end of due process protections emanates from the famous case of Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which held that welfare rights were a form of property and, thus, 
entitled to due process protections. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), however, the 
Court held that such property only existed where one had reasonable expectations of it as defined by 
state law. This opened the door for the principle that what constitutes property in this area is a creature 
of statute-an opening seized upon with a vengeance when Congress passed the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996, which explicitly claimed that benefits provided under 
the act were not an entitlement. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13. 
159. A famous example of this continuing refusal is Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 
(1970), which declined to find a constitutional right to welfare. This is not to say that scholars have not 
argued that subsistence or survival rights should be recognized as a matter of Constitutional Law. See 
Gilman, supra note 111, at 604. These attempts, led by Frank Michelman, were particularly prevalent in 
the last years of the Warren Court and early years of the Burger Court. See Frank I. Michelman, The 
Supreme Court, 1968 Tenn-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View 
of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973). For a more recent reconsideration and 
reconstruction of these arguments, see William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, 
Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001). See also Peter B. Edelman, The Next 
Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. I (1987). 
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3. The Job Market/or New Lawyers 
As a final enabler of RDR allocations, we can now come full circle and 
return to the market for legal services. 
I have already argued that the market for legal services, in conjunction 
with the American norm of disputing through agents, triggers the processes 
described by RDR theory, which, in turn, generate massive disparities in 
RDR allocations. 160 As a result, narrow segments of the disputing world-
primarily commercial litigators and transactional lawyers at large firms-
have a voracious appetite for more lawyers. Clients demand them (they 
need them under the First Principle of RDR) and firms demand them to ac-
commodate the demands of clients and because, not coincidentally, billing 
out associates for more than associates get paid generates handsome profits 
for the firm. 
The challenge for large firms, then, is to attract huge numbers of new 
lawyers. This is something of a challenge; it is no secret that the work 
hours at large firms are prodigious and the nature of the work, particularly 
for new associates, tends to be dull and repetitive. At the same time, it is no 
secret that there are substantial incentives to join these places. A primary 
one, of course, is compensation. As of this writing, average compensation 
for first-year associates at larger firms is about $125,000/61 which, includ-
ing substantial bonuses, is far in excess of compensation for lawyers in 
smaller practices, let alone legal services attorneys. 162 The ultimate brass 
ring is partnership: At the larger firms, compensation for partners routinely 
goes into the many millions. 163 
But money is not the only lure. Only the best get hired at these places. 
The "best" is usually shorthand for graduates from elite schools or, on occa-
sion, graduates from less elite schools with exceptional academic records. 
These firms need the best because the best, presumably, have the greatest 
aptitude for cutting edge legal work, and that, these firms say, is what they 
do-the complexity rationalization I have already described. l64 Large firms 
need the best because the complexity of the work so demands it. This feeds 
the intellectual ego of the applicant. Rarely, if ever, is this complexity ra-
tionale exposed as false as, I have shown, it is.165 
Another lure is the stakes rationale. Money talks in our culture, and a 
large firm's involvement in multi-million dollar transactions demon-
160. See supra text accompanying notes 8-36. 
]61. NAT'L i\SS'N FOR LA\V PLACEMENT, JOBS & J.D.'s: EMPLOYMEt..r-r AND SALARIES OF NEW 
LAW GRADUATES-CLASS OF 2003, at 30 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 NALP REPORT] 
162. The grossly disproportionate compensation for lawyers at large firms is part of a longstanding 
trend in which "the law, always the most unequal of professions, is probably becoming still more un-
equal." Sander & Williams. supra note 10, at 440. What is also remarkable is the apparent ability of 
large firms to maintain and continue to enhance income levels despite whatever economic retrenchment 
might be occurring in other realms of the legal profession or the country at large. [d. at 465. 
163. [d. 
164. See supra text accompanying notes 108-20. 
165. [d. 
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strates--either implicitly or explicitly-the importance and consequence of 
the firm's work in the world of finance and, indeed, to the world-at-Iarge. 
Again, this equivalence between money and consequence is never open to 
question as, indeed, it should be.166 
These three lures-money, the challenge of a complex practice, and the 
high stakes involved--combine to generate a corps of able-bodied associ-
ates ready to contribute their time and energy to the already vastly inflated 
RDR allocated to business disputes. 
This is, in and of itself, a sad state of affairs, but it only tells half the 
story. While there is no question that some law students have an interest in 
business law, there is also no question that many-if not many more-are 
attracted to law to help people, to contribute to society, or to promote social 
change. 167 Four realities-all, to a certain extent, consequences of RDR 
theory-inhibit or extinguish these impulses and encourage new lawyers to 
instead join the legions practicing business law. 
First, while compensation for large firm positions escalates, compensa-
tion for public interest positions has lagged further and further behind-a 
trend that has only accelerated with time. 168 Apart from those with a well-
compensated spouse or access to family resources, taking a public interest 
position is fast becoming not merely a financial sacrifice but a financial 
impossibility. The compensation differential has become one of kind, not of 
degree. Indeed, compensation for public interest positions sometimes flirts 
with eligibility for public assistance. 169 It takes a single-minded commit-
ment to public interest of extraordinary intensity to voluntarily enter the 
ranks of a workforce struggling to meet daily expenses when affluence is a 
plausible alternative. 
Second, many law students graduate with substantial student loans. 
One study estimated that a law school student carries debt upon graduation 
of nearly $46,000 for a graduate of a public law school and almost $73,000 
for a graduate of a private law school. 170 While loan forgiveness programs 
do exist and, in some instances, can help ease the burden at a limited num-
166. See supra text accompanying notes 121-29. 
167. Howard S. Erlanger & Charles R. Epp, Law Student Idealism and Job Choice: Some New Data 
OIl an Old Question, 30 L. & Soc. REV. 851 (1996) ("Commentaries and empirical studies over the past 
several decades have consistently suggested that while a substantial proportion of incoming law students 
are interested in careers in 'public interest law,' that interest wanes significantly during law school."). 
168. In 1992, the median entry-level salary for public interest positions was $26,000, while the 
median entry level salary for private firms was $47,500. NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS & 
J.D.'s: EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES OF NEW LAW GRADUATES-CLASS OF 1992, at 19 (1993). For 
2003-the last year for which data is available-the figures were $38,342 for public interest positions 
and $83,913 for private firms. 2003 NALP REPORT, supra note 161, at 30, 43. 
169. One new staff attorney for a Legal Aid Bureau in a mid-Atlantic city was both horrified and 
bemused to learn that his starting salary qualified him for a "Section 8 voucher"-a federal housing 
assistance program for the indigent. Interview with Robert L. Durocher, Apr. 16, 2004. 
170. EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS, FINANCING THE FuTuRE: EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS 2004 REPORT ON 
LAw SCHOOL REP A YMENT ASSISTANCE AND PuBLIC INTEREST SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS 15 (2004). 
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ber of schools,17I repaying a loan on the already meager salary of a public 
interest lawyer adds further-to use far too mild a word-challenges to liv-
ing on a public interest salary that slide in many instances into impossibili-
ties. 172 
Third, even after all of these financial burdens are taken into account, 
RDR theory dictates that the market generates a miniscule number of public 
interest positions. Indeed, as I have noted,173 apart from volume practices, 
which, for the most part, offer inferior quality of service to clients and, in 
any event, do not create large numbers of lawyer positions, the market gen-
erates virtually no demand for public interest lawyers not because there is 
no demand from potential clients, but because the potential clients doing the 
demanding have no resources to back up their demands with money. As a 
result, funding must come from non-market forces, such as charitable dona-
tions, foundation grants, and state and federal legislatures, none of which 
can fund more than a tiny percentage of the needed services. Needless to 
say, this is in marked contrast to the market forces that operate through 
RDR theory to generate voracious appetites for newly minted business law-
yers. 
Fourth, there is evidence suggesting that law school itself, both in terms 
of its traditional pedagogy and in terms of the content of its courses, tends to 
tamp down or extinguish law students' zeal for public service. 174 
The final twist to these processes-and perhaps the greatest enabler of 
all-is that the decisions new lawyers make to engage in a business law 
practice tend to be durable and permanent. Many a lawyer will enter into a 
large firm practice in anticipation of the day when they can do what they 
really want to do because student loans will be paid off, savings accounts 
will be plentiful, and college savings accounts will be adequately funded. 
For the vast majority, this day never comes. Apart from what appears to be 
a rigid psychological mandate to spend whatever you make, many find that 
the norms of modern American culture are expensive norms, and it is noto-
riously difficult to give up what one has as opposed to simply not having 
171. Id. at 17. The growth of such loan forgiveness programs-usually referred to as "Loan Repay· 
ment Assistance Programs" (LRAPs)-is hardly uniform; restrictive school budgets have both limited 
the ability of some schools to add such programs and, in some instances, impose stringent eligibility 
requirements. See id. 
172. Id. at 15 (noting that typical monthly payments to repay a student loan "are about one-quarter to 
one-third of a starting public interest attorney's monthly take-home salary ... leaving very little for 
necessities such as housing. food and transportation"). See also ABA COMM'N ON LoAN REPAYMENT & 
FORGIVENESS, LIFTING THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PuBLIC SERVICE 9 (2003) 
("Despite their deep commitment to ensure access to justice for all citizens, many law school graduates" 
find that the due to the rising cost of a legal education, they are "forced to forego their dreams of public 
service."). 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 16-27. 
174. See Erlanger & Epp, supra note 167; ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: THE 
FATE OF PuBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL (Howard S. Erlanger ed., Univ. of TIl. 
Press 1989); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 38 (David Kairys ed., Basic Books 1998) (1982). 
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what one has never had. 175 There is the additional disincentive of retooling 
one's professional expertise; few have the courage and energy to toss away 
years devoted to understanding the intricacies of securities regulation, bond 
funds, ERISA, reinsurance, and so forth to learn for the first time complex 
bodies of so-called poverty law with which they are utterly unfamiliar. 
The end result is that the many thousands of law graduates who enter a 
business law practice each year stay there for the rest of their careers. The 
locus of the practice might be the same or different: Some make partner in 
a large, medium, or small firm; some go in-house which involves, in effect, 
having one business client instead of many; some work for the many state 
and federal agencies that regulate commerce (in a way, this particular group 
is moving from the legal services to the third-party actor component of 
RDR, albeit still in the service of resolving business disputes); and a small 
number move into academia where they teach business law courses. Only a 
tiny percentage move into a practice that could at all be characterized as 
public interest. 
VI. Is THERE A WAY OUT? 
There are unquestionably social costs to dispute resolution. While some 
of these costs are borne by parties and some are borne by taxpayers, there 
always seems to be enough RDR deployed in just the right places to serve 
the interests of affluent parties, typically commercial interests. But even 
more importantly, the set of mutually reinforcing factors that I have outlined 
generates a cost for all of us: Legal resources are becoming increasingly 
intensified on commercial disputes, and the best, most elite forms of dispute 
resolution-judicial or otherwise-are becoming specialized, elite processes 
where elite, specialized lawyers work to resolve commercial disputes. 
It is impossible to know whether this circumstance is reversible, al-
though current trends do not bode well, at least for the near future. That 
said, the initiatives that have virtually no chance of success are those that 
seek to work within the norms of a system locked into the principles of 
RDR theory. What remains are a number of fresher strategies that operate 
outside the framework I have been sketching. For that very reason, these 
have, at least, the possibility of gaining traction against almost overwhelm-
ing forces. 
A. Initiatives that Face Long Odds 
The following is a list of initiatives that are proposed and undertaken 
with the best of intentions and, not infrequently, generate real assistance to 
individual clients. In my view, however, these initiatives will never spur 
175. Cognitive scientists have characterized this tendency as "loss aversion." See Daniel Kahneman 
& Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
44 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995). 
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substantial change, due to the set of mutually reinforcing and intensifying 
phenomena that I have detailed,I76 which are simply too entrenched and 
powered by economic self-interest to allow for much reform except at the 
margins, if even there. 
1. Pro Bono 
Pro bono initiatives will never significantly redress the disproportionate 
allocation of RDR.177 Pro bono lawyers, while providing extraordinary as-
sistance to underserved disputants and, in some instances, allocating sub-
stantial legal services resources otherwise available only to high-resource 
disputants, will always be fighting a losing battle against the market for 
legal services and the three principles of RDR. It would be difficult for 
even optimistic proponents of pro bono to expect that most lawyers will not 
continue to be attracted to lucrative segments of the profession and that the 
basic principles of RDR will not continue to operate to allocate RDR in the 
ways I have described. Indeed, available data about the lack of success of 
pro bono initiatives confirms this gloomy assessment.178 
In addition, there is an aspect to pro bono initiatives that renders them, 
at least systemically, counterproductive. These activities tend to be well-
publicized and often present accomplished and otherwise well-compensated 
lawyers fighting for the "little guy." Without being dismissive of the very 
important work undertaken in this regard, these activities may promote a 
sense of complacency among the public and, more importantly, within the 
profession that the problems about the allocation of RDR are not as urgent 
and tragic as they are. A related point is that, in light of the complexity and 
stakes rationales,179 a substantial component of pro bono work tends to be 
focused on certain cases with a constitutional or high-visibility dimension, 
leaving those so-called simple and routine cases-landlord-tenant, family 
law, government benefits-unaddressed.18o In the rare instances where pro 
bono lawyers do engage in those seemingly routine poverty law cases, there 
exist risks of incompetent representation because such lawyers have neither 
the experience nor the training to gain expertise in these challenging ar-
eas. 181 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 11-34. 
177. Despite perennial calls from bar associations for initiatives and incentives to promote pro bono 
participation, most commentators agree that, barring a sea change in the bar's distaste for mandatory pro 
bono, pro bono work will never act as more than an incremental step towards redressing the inequities I 
uescribe. Rhode, supra note 10, at iSOS-14, UH9. 
178. Greg Winter, Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services to the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2000, at AI; Rhode, supra note 10, at 1808 (noting that in terms of the performance of pro bono work, 
the performance of the bar as a whole remains at shameful levels). 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 108-29. 
180. I can speak to this from personal experience. In my years litigating in Brooklyn'S Housing 
Court and in Baltimore's Rent Court, I do not recall once seeing a pro bono attorney representing a 
tenant. 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 121-29. 
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2. Enhanced Funding for Individual Representation Through Subsi-
dized Legal Services 
Even if politically feasible, which it is currently not nor is it likely to be 
in the foreseeable future, increased funding for subsidized legal services for 
individual representation will not achieve more than marginal improve-
ments in the lot of most low-resource disputants. The reason is straightfor-
ward: Assuming (and this is a huge assumption) that there is such an in-
crease in funding, the First and Second Principles of RDR mean that high-
resource disputants will respond by allocating more resources to their own 
private legal services to ensure a fair chance of success. While the Third 
Principle holds that mass justice fora might thereby expend more resources 
per case as a result, subsidized legal services would have to attract more and 
more money in order to keep up with the greater expenditures on legal ser-
vices by high-resource disputants. Even the most optimistic projections 
about enhanced subsidies for legal services could never generate enough to 
fund such an arms race. Sooner or later, subsidized legal services-and the 
clients they serve-will lose. The end result would be a different equilib-
rium with, perhaps, more total RDR per dispute, but one that will still favor 
high-resource disputants. In short, RDR theory suggests that there is an ab-
solute limit to how successful such efforts can be. 
That said, there has been some creative retooling of legal services of-
fices and innovative proposals to enhance the scope, efficiency, and integra-
tion of the legal services network. 182 Proposals to "unbundle" legal ser-
vices l83 or to provide limited legal services l84 and to employ the Internet,185 
among other initiatives, offer not only greater efficiency in the use of exist-
ing funds but, perhaps, fresh ways of approaching legal services work so as 
to empower clients-an important way to move outside the RDR box to 
which I will return in some detail shortly. 
182. For a thoughtful and comprehensive plan along these lines, see Houseman, supra note 22, at 
394-433. 
183. A leading proponent of the notion of unbundling legal services is Forrest Mosten. Forrest S. 
Mosten, Ullbulldlillg of Legal Services alld the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q. 421 (1994). Unbundling 
seeks to break the traditional dichotomy between either representing a client or not representing a client 
by enabling the client to "be in charge of selecting from lawyers' services only a portion of the full 
package and contracting with the lawyer accordingly." Id. at 423. 
184. See gellerally ABA SECTION OF LITIG., HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE: A 
REPORT OF THE MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE (2003). 
185. For one on-line example, see the Maryland People's Law Library, available at 
http://www.peoples-law.info/Home/PublicWeb (last visited Mar. 22, 2(05) 
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3. Easing Unauthorized Practice of Law Restrictions 
One set of proposals that seems to have garnered the most support 
among academics is easing unauthorized practice of law restrictions in order 
to enable paraprofessionals to serve clients who otherwise cannot obtain 
legal advice. 186 As proponents of such initiatives recognize, a primary chal-
lenge here is the bar's vigorous opposition to even modest exceptions to its 
professional monopoly on legal services, even in areas where lawyers dare 
not tread because there is no money to be made.187 Such initiatives are of-
ten set forth in conjunction with other proposals to simplify legal procedures 
and forms to better enable pro se litigants and paraprofessionals to navigate 
legal issues facing indigents. 188 
Assuming opposition from the organized bar can be overcome-again, 
a large if-such proposals, in my view, have merit only in narrowly circum-
scribed circumstances. The following statement by Deborah Rhode, an 
otherwise eloquent and persistent critic of inequities in access to justice, 
illustrates why: 
Reducing the need for professional assistance calls for strategies 
along several dimensions: increased simplification of the law; more 
self-help initiatives; better protection of unrepresented parties; 
greater access to nonlawyer providers; and expanded opportunities 
for informal dispute resolution in accessible out-of-court settings. 
As critics have long noted, American legal procedures are strewn 
with unnecessary formalities, archaic jargon, and cumbersome ritu-
als that discourage individuals from resolving legal problems them-
selves. Simplified forms and streamlined procedures could expand 
ordinary Americans' opportunities to handle routine matters such as 
governmental benefits, probate, uncontested divorces, landlord-
tenant disputes, and consumer claims. 189 
It is hard to argue, in theory, with the efficacy of such proposals, and, 
indeed, the potential uses of ADR-albeit in very specific forms-is some-
thing I will advocate shortly.190 The problem, however, is that these and 
similar proposals risk further intensifying and instantiating the procedural 
and substantive hierarchies that J have been describing. Why are issues 
involving governmental benefits, landlord-tenant disputes, and consumer 
claims merely routine? Does this mean they are simple, which is false? 
Does this mean that they are common, which, of course, is true, but is this 
not more of an indictment of the failure of society to redress poverty than an 
186. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 73, at 1027; Rhode, supra note 10, at 1817. 
187. See Abel, supra note 73, at 1027. 
188. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 10, at 1816-17. 
189. /d. at 1816 (footnote omitted). 
190. See infra text accompanying notes 198-229. 
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opportunity to make poverty law cases "routine" in a procedural and sub-
stantive sense? Indeed, should it not be the goal of a just system to make 
such matters non-routine? Should matters critical to life and health be sub-
jected to "simplified forms and streamlined procedures," 191 particularly 
given the record of mass justice courts that have, at least nominally, adopted 
such reforms? Why should these of all cases be entrusted to a corps of 
paraprofessionals, the assumption being that such routine matters do not 
need the full panoply of skills that attorneys, at least in theory, bring to bear 
in legal representation? 
I do not wish to overstate my case here. I do see a role for the initia-
tives that Professor Rhode and others have proposed. I also see extraordi-
nary dangers that lurk in making incremental reforms to a system that has 
shown great power to transform even well-meaning initiatives into yet more 
ways to stack the deck against indigent disputants. 
B. Breaking the Stranglehold of the Principles of RDR 
As I have noted, RDR theory is not a universal law of nature; it is, 
rather, contingent on certain conditions, albeit conditions that have long 
operated as assumed norms. These conditions are, first, a disputing-
through-agents model where, second, market forces determine the availabil-
ity and selection of agents representing parties in particular disputes. 
Alternatives do exist that have at least the promise of operating outside 
these conditions, thereby bypassing the inevitabilities of RDR theory. One 
alternative-mediation-minimizes the "agents" condition, but not in the 
way Professor Rhode proposes. 192 A sophisticated, well-funded, adequately 
housed mediation program, while not necessarily eliminating the need for 
attorneys, limits or, in some cases, eliminates the role of attorneys. Instead, 
from an RDR perspective, it injects available resources into the mediation 
session itself. In so doing, mediation also draws upon a resource that is 
largely untapped in adjudicative models of dispute resolution: the parties 
themselves. Panies, not lawyers or judges or arbitrators, playa central role 
in mediation. 193 By this, of course, I do not mean that the parties provide 
economic resources to lawyers to resolve disputes. Rather, parties in media-
tion act as the primary and direct means through which disputes are re-
solved. 
This is truly something new. It points to an untapped source of RDR 
that heretofore has been completely overlooked: the disputants themselves. 
By doing so, it breaks apart the tightly locked set of principles that gener-
191. See supra text accompanying note 189. 
192. Id. 
193. Available evidence suggests that many disputants would welcome this central role in dispute 
resolution. Young, supra note 16, at 574 (noting that, in interviews with applicants for subsidized legal 
services, subjects described how "they want to be in control of their own legal destiny, knowing they can 
make their own decisions."). 
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ates current RDR allocations because the Principles of RDR draw their life-
blood from the centrality of legal services to disputing. By moving such 
services to the margins, mediation (and by this I mean adequately funded 
mediation services-a crucial caveat) bypasses the tight control that those 
disputants who have the economic power to meaningfully participate in that 
market exert over the allocation of RDR The First Principle no longer ap-
plies if the provision of legal services no longer holds the key to sophisti-
cated and individualized dispute resolution, and if the First Principle no 
longer applies, the Second Principle becomes irrelevant. The introduction 
and validation of a third component of RDR-the disputants themselves-
breaks the iron grip that the quantity and quality of legal services has on the 
quantity and quality of third-party actors. By marginalizing legal services 
and introducing the parties as carriers of RDR, there is, at long last, the pos-
sibility of some rough measure of equality in the allocation of RDR 
Another altemative-a significant expansion of the bounds and in-
volvement of the private bar and public interest lawyers in "community 
lawyering"-achieves some similar results through very different means. 
Community lawyering draws its power by working with and empowering 
low-resource communities to attract more resources to their communities. 194 
Given that this is primarily-although not exclusively-a transactional 
practice, it minimizes the "third-party actor" component of RDR 195 This is 
the ultimate in preservation of "judicial resources": This type of practice 
does not involve litigation (or, for that matter, mediation), so judges (and 
mediators) need not apply. 
Moreover, like mediation, community lawyering seeks to draw ideas, 
energy, and initiative from low-resource communities themselves. In this 
respect, it too introduces disputants (or, more accurately in this context, 
communities which, of course, are made up of individuals) as an untapped 
resource distinct from lawyers and third-party actors. Indeed, a thread in 
the literature and practice of community lawyering displays an unusual and 
refreshing humility as to the power of lawyering to effect social change: 
Lawyers hold no monopoly on how to achieve it and, indeed, perhaps 
should playa more subsidiary, supporting role. 
194. See infra text accompanying notes 233-39. 
195. ld. 
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Before moving on to a more detailed discussion of these alternatives, 
the following Table displays the RDR profiles of mediation and community 
lawyering. 
TABLE 2 
RDR PROFILES OF AN ADEQUATELY FUNDED 
MEDIATION PROGRAM FOR INDIGENTS AND 
A COMMUNITY LAWYERING PRACTICE 
Mediation for Indigents (Adequately Funded) 
Resource Level of Parties: Low 
RDR Allocated to Legal Services: Moderately low (or nonexistent) 
RDR Allocated to Third-Party Actors: High 
RDR Carried by Disputants: High 
Community Lawyering 
Resource Level of Parties: Low 
RDR Allocated to Legal Services: Moderate 
RDR Allocated to Third-Party Actors: Nonexistent (usually) 
RDR Carried by Disputants: High 
The RDR profiles set forth here achieve something that the traditional 
forms of dispute resolution set forth in Table 1196 do not: They supplement 
RDR by drawing upon the non-monetary resources available through the 
creativity, time, and energy available to disputants themselves. This charac-
teristic breaks the causative chain whereby resources of legal representation 
necessarily demand and receive amounts of third-party assistance adequate 
to vindicate the interests of the high-resource party-an ironclad correlation 
that always operates against the interests oflow-income disputants. 
All of this might sound promising in theory and in tables. A critical 
question, however, is what these proposals really mean and what they re-
quire in practice. 
1. A Mass Justice Mediation Altemative? 
Jerold S. Auerbach, in the quote that opened this Article, wrote how the 
"Haves usually are better served by legal formalism.,,197 But what about 
legal informalism, such as that embodied in mediation? 
196. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
197. See Auerbach, supra note I, at 144. 
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a. What Is Mediation? 
Mediation, to the surprise of those who consider it merely a settlement 
conference under a different name, can be an extraordinarily rich, challeng-
ing, and satisfying process that arises from entirely different premises than 
adjudication. As I have noted elsewhere, the danger in approaching media-
tion in its more sophisticated forms is in not recognizing it as the strange 
thing it is, particularly as compared to adjudication. 198 
A full treatment of mediation is beyond the scope of this Article, but a 
brief overview is not. Unlike adjudication, mediation does not rely on the 
historical reconstruction of what happened as a means to order the rights 
and obligations of the present. Rather, the here-and-now-which may, of 
course, include perspectives on the past-is what matters most. 199 Media-
tors do not act as decision-makers; indeed, in some forms of mediation, it is 
anathema for mediators to evaluate or offer opinions as to the strength or 
justice of each party's claim. Rather, mediators facilitate, and their power 
emerges from their success in doing so, not from the imposition of some 
externally granted authority.2oo Mediation has few formal procedures; its 
pragmatic goal is to facilitate problem-solving through "whatever works.,,201 
While lawyers can and do participate in mediation, mediators want parties 
to own the process themselves and thereby encourage parties to engage 
fully, directly, and vigorously in the resolution of their own disputes. In this 
regard, a primary goal of mediation is dispute resolution not through agents 
"but through autonomy and self-determination" on the part of parties.202 
In light of these differences and many others, mediation and adjudica-
tion are entirely different activities, like house-painting and bookkeeping.203 
This is a critical point that is often lost when the role of mediation as a form 
of dispute resolution is discussed. 
What I have been describing is "good mediation," and, unfortunately, 
there is plenty of bad mediation that goes under its name. This distinction 
will have an important influence on the proposals that I will sketch out. 
198. The principles I discuss in the following paragraph are described in much greater detail in 
Robert Rubinson. Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of Dispute Resolution, 10 
CUN1CALL. REV. 833,846-58 (2004). 
199. [d. at 852-53. 
200. [d. at 850-52. 
201. [d. at 853. 
202. Nolan-Haley, supra note 98, at 49. 
203. An important consequence is that despite the prevalence of former judges as mediators, "[tlhere 
is ... no obvious match between the characteristics that make for excellent judging and the skills re-
quired for successful mediation." Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or 
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 670 (1986). 
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b. The "Power Critiques" 
For every study or commentator finding mediation for indigents brim-
ming with promise,204 others find it overblown or downright dangerous.z°5 
It is necessary to pause, albeit briefly in this setting, over these critiques. 
The crux of the most pointed critiques of mediation in the context of 
poverty law is that it instantiates power imbalances?06 Straightforwardly 
put, this critique holds that the very informality of mediation, as well as its 
confidentiality and its lack of judicial review, means that disempowered 
parties will have their disempowerment recapitulated in mediation. 
This risk is, in my view, no doubt real. Problems arise for this critique, 
however, in its implicit and sometimes explicit praises of adjudication as 
somehow an effective power neutralizer. Courts, for example, minimize 
prejudice in the following ways: 
[T]he formalities of a court trial-the flag, the black robes, the rit-
ual-remind those present that the occasion calls for the higher,. 
"public" values, rather than the lesser values embraced during mo-
ments of informality and intimacy. In a courtroom trial the Ameri-
can Creed, with its emphasis on fairness, equality, and respect for 
personhood, governs. Equality of status, or something approaching 
it, is preserved--each party is represented by an attorney and has a 
prescribed time and manner for speaking, putting on evidence, and 
questioning the other side. Equally important, formal adjudication 
avoids the unstructured, intimate interactions that, according to so-
cial scientists, foster prejudice. The rules of procedure maintain 
204. See, e.g., Judith V. Caprez & Micki A. Armstrong, A Study of Domestic Mediation Outcomes 
with Indigent Parents, 39 FAM. cr. REv. 415 (2001) (finding "that domestic mediation with indigent 
clients is equally as effective as domestic mediation with nonindigent clients"); Carol J. King, Burdening 
Access to Justice: The Cost of Divorce Mediation on the Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 375,459-60 
(1999) ("Mediation programs provide an opportunity for productive discussion of divorce issues be-
tween ... pro se litigants."); Houseman, supra note 22, at 409 (noting that concerns about ADR for the 
poor "can be addressed without depriving low-income persons of their rights or abilities to resolve 
disputes in an equitable manner"); Zimmerman, supra note 45, at 201 (stating that author is "convinced 
that there are opportunities to use ADR in poor communities as well as in existing programs .... "). 
205. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et a\., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; Larry R. Spain, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
for the Poor: Is It An Alternative?, 70 N.D. L. REv. 269 (\994). A particularly pointed critique has been 
developed by Richard Abel, who maintains that mediation and other forms of "informal justice" act to 
minimize concerted action and promote "social control" by moving claims for justice away from public 
adjudication to private fora which only resolve individual disputes, not systemic issues. See, e.g., Rich-
ard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in I THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 267 
(Richard Abel ed., 1982); Richard L. Abel, Conservative Conflict and the Reproduction of Capitalism: 
The Role of Informal Justice, 9 INT'L J. SOCIOLOGY 245 (1981). One plausible response to these cri-
tiques is embedded in this Article: While such critics often claim that "formal adjudication" protects less 
powerful disputants, the much vaunted procedural safeguards designed to protect the less powerful 
hardly exist in the "mass justice" courts I have described. 
206. There are, of course, detailed responses to this "power critique." See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Ponia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's l.LJwyering Process, I BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (arguing that, in some instances, mediation is more suitable for "female needs" 
than litigation). 
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distance between the parties. Counsel for the parties do not address 
one another, but present the issue to the trier of fact. The rules pre-
serve the formality of the setting by dictating in detail how this con-
frontation is to be conducted.207 
147 
Apart from being simply wrong-"each side is represented by an attor-
ney" presents an ideal, not the reality of most adjudication in Americio8-
this statement, at least as it plays out in the mass justice fora I have de-
scribed,209 describes with some accuracy the care courts use to present the 
trappings of justice. The problem, of course, is that there is none of the 
substance. As Marc Galanter has put it, in overload situations typical of 
mass justice courts, "there are more commitments in the formal system than 
there are resources to honor them-more rights and rules 'on the books' 
than can be vindicated or enforced.,,210 Indeed, such courts' professed "em-
phasis on fairness, equality, and respect for personhood," and their ultimate 
inability to vindicate these values, makes the profession of them all the 
more empty and, given the interests at stake, offensive. 
c. Mass Justice Mediation Done Right 
Can mediation do any better? I believe it can, if we keep in mind an 
obsessive goal that must be reiterated again and again: Mediation cannot be 
co-opted by forces that stack the deck in favor of high-resource parties. 
This can be accomplished in terms of RDR theory by moving the legal ser-
vices component of RDR to a more peripheral role and by bringing a for-
merly untapped resource-the disputants themselves-into a central role in 
dispute resolution. 
My proposal is simple, albeit one that, as of this writing, does not exist 
in practice: How about a corps of well-trained, dedicated, well-compensated 
mediators supported with substantial resources to facilitate matters involv-
ing low-income disputants? Done properly (this is worth repeating--done 
properly), such a program would, I believe, enable poverty law advocates 
and disputants to actually trust a process-something heretofore (with good 
reason) heretical. A properly constituted mediation program could break 
the mutually reinforcing concentration of the resources of dispute resolution 
of RDR theory. Dispute resolution resources-time and money for com-
pensation and training of mediators, adequate time and resources for hold-
ing mediation sessions, and, most of all, the power and time of disputants 
themselves which costs the state nothing at all-can be focused on problem-
solving. 
207. Delgado et a!., supra note 205, at 1388 (footnote omitted). 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 10-29. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49, 76-81. 
210. Galanter, supra note 18, at 122. 
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The heart of a successful mediation program lies with creating a corps 
of dedicated, able mediators. A rigorous training process, complete with a 
period of apprenticeship and co-mediation, should be required of all candi-
dates. Depending on the nature of the cases the mediator intends to medi-
ate, candidates could be drawn from professions other than law, especially 
mental health professionals, teachers, or other "helping" professions?1l The 
current standards that have been established in many Jurisdictions-usually 
16 to 40 hours of combined lecture and simulations21 -fall far short of in-
suring that mediators have adequate experience and expertise. It would be 
preposterous to unleash judges on litigants with comparable credentials, 
and, of course, no judicial system does or would ever do so. Mediators in 
these programs must receive meaningful compensation competitive to the 
compensation received by judges in a given jurisdiction. Moreover, as with 
judges, there must be a meaningful grievance procedure for disputants who 
believe mediators have acted inappropriately or are biased, and a continuing 
quality-control review procedure-perhaps accomplished through a peer-
review system with other mediators.213 
Second, caseloads for these mediators must be carefully controlled. 
One tragic component among many of the mass justice courts is the numb-
ness that tends to descend upon judges who are faced day after day with 
overwhelming dockets. If the administrative imperative to process huge 
numbers of cases does not crush individualized attention to litigants, sheer 
judicial burnout surely will. If anything, mediation requires even greater 
amounts of attention and concentration than judging.214 Too many cases 
can turn the most dedicated, sophisticated mediator into an impatient, irrita-
ble mediator, and an impatient, irritable mediator is worse than no mediator 
at all. 
There also needs to be adequate space and time to conduct mediation 
sessions properly. For once, RDR should be deployed with an eye on the 
needs and limitations of indigent parties. Facilities need to be in an area (or, 
even better, in multiple areas serving different neighborhoods) that is rea-
sonably accessible to disputants who must rely on public transportation or 
who are homebound. Available times for sessions should include early 
211. As I have noted, mediation is an entirely different activity from adjudication. The advocacy 
skills often associated with legal training are, if anything, an impediment to a successful career as a 
mediator. See supm text accompanying notes 198-203. 
212. See, e.g., K!MBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 435 (3d ed. 2004). 
213. I do not share the hopefulness of some commentators that volunteer mediators can meet this 
need. See. e.g., King. supm note, 204 at 463. There has long been an impulse away from part-time or 
volunteer judging, and for good reason; judging is a full time job that takes dedication and experience. It 
is difficult to see why mediation-in many respects a role that implicates an even greater range of "intel-
ligences" and skills than does judging-should not be mediated by full-time, experienced mediators. 
Moreover, proposals to employ "volunteer mediators" replicate the two-tiered dispute resolution system 
that my proposal seeks at all costs to avoid. If commercial interests are entitled to the services of tax-
payer funded, full-time judges in federal and state courts over a course of months or years, why should 
indigent disputants-with issues of homelessness and subsistence at stake-not be entitled to taxpayer 
funded, full-time mediators? 
214. See King, supra note 204, at 467. 
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mornings and evenings as well as weekends to accommodate work sched-
ules and child-care responsibilities. Just as, at least in theory, there is no set 
time limit for adjudication, there should be no administratively or statutorily 
imposed deadlines for the conclusion of mediation sessions.215 
Moreover, there must be a highly trained, well-compensated staff that 
could aid disputants in making determinations as to whether mediation is 
appropriate in a given case. This, too, is a time-intensive, challenging activ-
ity requiring expertise and sensitivity. Indeed, despite attempts to identify 
categories of cases that are not appropriate for mediation-especially cases 
involving domestic violence-this task is simply too complex and multi-
faceted for deceptively easy and efficient cookie-cutter solutions.2l6 It can, 
however, be provided by lawyers or, better yet, by mental health or social 
service professionals with expertise in a given area. 
Next, there must be opportunities for interdisciplinary interventions. 
Another tragic consequence of mass justice and, indeed, of the legal system 
in general is its tendency to reduce multifaceted, complex circumstances 
into a set of legal issues?l7 There is no question, for example, that family 
law cases involve psychological, sociological, economic, and medical is-
sues, as well as many other things. Such issues almost invariably extend to 
other poverty law matters as well.218 The program I am proposing would 
move away from the assumption that dispute resolution should not sully 
itself with such questions; mediators would be fully aware of the range of 
supports available to disputants and would be in a position to make referrals 
when appropriate.219 Indeed, evidence suggests that the addition of other 
215. This is one of the most misunderstood aspects of mediation. In terms of my RDR model, many 
seem to view the "mass justice" courts as something of an ideal for mediation in terms of processing vast 
numbers of cases. As a result, in the zeal for ')udicial efficiency," it is not unusual for cash-strapped 
court-annexed mediation programs to impose time deadlines on mediation. Virtually anyone who has 
done or understands mediation, however, recognizes that it is a time-intensive process that can and often 
does require multiple sessions in order to be effective. See, e.g., King, supra note 204, at 466 ("[F]amily 
and divorce mediation is seldom concluded in one session."). 
216. A classic example is the oft-retold position that cases involving domestic violence are inappro-
priate for mediation. In fact, while there is no question that instances of domestic violence might well be 
inappropriate for mediation, a detailed examination of the circumstances is necessary before reaching 
that conclusion. See, e.g., King, supra note 204, at 445 (noting that "the presence or absence of domes-
tic violence is too crude a screening measure for evaluating mediation programs"). One commentator 
notes that it should be the province of the "victims of domestic violence ... to make an informed choice 
about which divorce process-mediated or adversarial-will best meet the needs of their families." Ver 
Stecgh, supra note 77, at 147. See also Alexandria Zylstra, Mediation and Domestic Violence: A Practi-
cal Screening Method/or Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 253. 
217. This tendency is so pronounced that it warrants revising de Tocqueville's famous observation 
that "[t]here is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a 
judicial one" into "there is hardly [any] question in the United States which docs not sooner or later turn 
into a judicial one." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969). 
218. Many considered proposals regarding the expansion of legal services to the poor take this into 
account. See, e.g., Houseman, supra note 22, at 373 (proposing legal assistance that "would coordinate 
and collaborate with human services providers and community organizations to deliver holistic and 
interdisciplinary services"). 
219. Interestingly, one model for this view of lawyering is present in some public defender and 
prosecutor offices which employ social workers and other support personnel to assist defendants with 
issues of substance abuse. See, e.g., David E. Rovella, The Best Defense .. .. : Rebuilding Clients' Lives 
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professionals to mediation-especially psychotherapists in divorce media-
tion-substantially enhances the benefits of the process?20 
I also propose a new rule regarding the presence of attorneys in these 
mediation sessions: Attorneys are welcome to attend and both protect their 
clients and facilitate the process, but each party must have an attorney. In 
other words, either all parties are represented at mediation, or no parties are 
represented at mediation?21 No exceptions. In the event neither party has 
an attorney present at the mediation session, the mediator would have had 
extensive training and experience in addressing "power differentials" that 
might arise, including, if necessary, the termination of the mediation. 
As a related development, I propose that a mediation program employ a 
corps of lawyers who will represent mediation participants who otherwise 
cannot afford a lawyer. In the spirit of the trend towards unbundling legal 
services,222 the representation will be limited to three goals: (1) insure that 
disputants understand what mediation is; (2) advise disputants about what 
legal remedies might be available; and (3) review any final agreements 
reached in mediation. It would not be contemplated that the lawyer will 
attend the mediation session. These discrete roles will enable each lawyer 
to represent many disputants, thus limiting the cost of the legal services 
RDR, while insuring that disputants will not bargain away substantial rights 
of which they have no knowledge.223 
In terms of administration of these programs heretofore, mediation pro-
grams have invariably sprung up as adjuncts to the judicial system. Judges 
refer cases to mediation, mediations often take place at courthouses, clerks' 
offices maintain lists of potential mediators, and, most importantly, pro-
grams are funded through the budgets of the judiciary. Such arrange-
ments-the norm today-reflect the perspective of ')udges [who] view me-
diation as a tool of good court management.,,224 Inevitably, a judicial sys-
tem obsessed with clearing dockets pressures mediators to settle cases 
whether the disputants want to do so or not?25 
To Keep Them from Coming Back, NAT'L L.J., Ian. 31, 2000, at AI (describing indigent criminal de-
fense group called the "Bronx: Defenders," that collaborates with "social workers, drug treatment pro-
grams and community groups"). See generally Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Commu-
nity: Expanding the Conceptual and Institutional Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 OEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 401 (2001). 
220. JANET R. JOHNSTON & LINDA E.O. CAMPBELL, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS AND 
RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 198 (1988); King, supra note 204. at 472-73. There indeed seems to 
be something of a trend, even among lawyers, to ex:amine solutions to social problems that draw upon 
resources and ideas that are ex:tra-Iegal. See generally Ooodmark, supra note 79. 
221. This. in and of itself. is an important step in redressing the hideous power inequities that charac-
terize "mass justice" courts and fears of how "power differentials" can play out in mediation. See Zim-
merman, supra note 45, at 191. 
222. See supra tex:t accompanying notes 183-84. 
223. For a discussion of the risk of this happening in mediation, see Engler, supra note 26, 
at 2010-11. 
224. Nolan-Haley, supra note 98, at 62-63. 
225. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 26, at 2010-11. Of course, when parties refuse or are unable to 
reach an agreement in mediation, the case is referred to the mass justice courts I have already described, 
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I propose to sever the pervasive relationship between the judicial system 
and mediation programs. Obsessive care must be lavished on avoiding the 
taint of RDR commonplaces like "judicial economy," the perversions of 
mass justice, and, more generally, of the norms of how things have been 
done for too long. This is not to say that referrals should not be made be-
tween these two systems: They should, but mediation must be a co-equal 
unit, not another example of mass justice under a different name. Indeed, 
my mediation program would accept both matters that are the subject of 
pending litigation and matters that are not. 
And, of course, these mediation services must be free or at a nominal 
cost that can be waived when a party is indigent.226 
It is important to note what this proposal is not: It is not a cheap way to 
clear dockets.227 Mediation, done properly, takes time and resources. My 
proposal may indeed serve judicial economy in that judges are less likely to 
be involved in dispute resolution, but it does nothing for "mediator econ-
omy," which, if the sole criteria, would be singularly ill-served. My pro-
posal, moreover, does not do much for the rapidity of dispute resolution. As 
I have noted, mediation, done properly, will win no dispute resolution speed 
races; it takes time, energy, and focus for all participants. This is not to say 
that mediation is not an efficient mode of dispute resolution, however; liti-
gation often forces parties to expend substantial time and money on the pe-
ripherals of and preparation for dispute resolution-motion practice, dis-
covery, witness preparation, and so forth. In contrast, the relative informal-
ity of mediation means that time spent is spent almost exclusively actually 
in the mediation working on resolving disputes. 
That said, in terms of RDR efficiency, my proposal arguably provides a 
decent return. It has long been an article of faith among supporters of me-
diation that the direct involvement of stakeholders in crafting settlement 
agreements promotes continued compliance, and some empirical evidence 
bears this out.228 Many indigent disputants encounter the legal system nu-
merous times; successful mediation reduces this, thus preserving dispute 
see supra text accompanying notes 41-49,76--81, which remain as overwhelmed and lacking in process 
as ever. 
226. This is a critical aspect of the program. It has long been recognized that the sophistication and 
success of dispute resolution is meaningless if disputants cannot afford access to it. See generally King, 
supra note 204, at 375. Some jurisdictions provide for such waiver or payment of mediation fees in the 
event a party is indigent. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 44.102(5)(b) (West 2(03); s.C. R. CIR. CT. ADR R. 
lO(e) (2004). Of course, even assuming that indigent parties can navigate whatever requirements are 
necessary in order to demonstrate indigence, the availability of such a waiver or state payment of media-
tion fees says nothing about the quality of the mediation sessions that subsequently take place. 
227. This is either the spoken or unspoken basis for the explosive growth of court-annexed or court-
connected mediation programs. See, e.g., New Horizon Fin. Servs. LLC v. First Fin. Equities. 278 F. 
Supp. 2d 259, 262 (D. Conn. 2003) (quoting Sharon Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai. No. CV980077828S. 
2001 WL 1659516, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2001) (noting "the policy of judicial economy, the 
very reason mediation is encouraged"»; ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT 
OF CASES IN ADR 23 (2002) (noting critiques of courts who have adopted ADR procedures "to save 
court resources"). 
228. See. e.g .• King, supra note 204, at 437 (noting that "data supports the hypothesis that direct 
involvement in the settlement process results in greater commitment to the agreed upon resolution"). 
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resolution resources that would otherwise have to be allocated in the future. 
Moreover, while I have elsewhere argued that lawyers have a productive 
role to play in mediation,229 the presence of lawyers, it has long been recog-
nized, is not critical to mediation and, depending on the lawyer and the 
situation, can be counterproductive?30 
Whatever the ultimate balance sheet tallies, such a program would, at 
long last, provide what has been lacking for so long: A sensitive, individu-
alized, and focused mechanism for resolving disputes involving low-income 
disputants. While mediation might well be a more efficient mode of dispute 
resolution, this fact seems to me beside the point. Mediation can generate 
more satisfying, comprehensive solutions to desperate problems. Where are 
resources better directed than to situations where human dignity and sur-
vival are at risk? 
The crux, as always, is there is currently no mediation program that 
looks remotely like my proposal. A process called mediation can be used 
for good or ill, and therein lurks the danger of proposals like mine. 
2. Community Lawyering 
There has been an explosion of interest in "community lawyering.,,23I 
Like many trends of genuine significance, the nature of "community 
lawyering" is not easy to pin down. Indeed, in its more sophisticated forms, 
community lawyers do not presuppose what legal services a community 
wants or needs; the indeterminacy of such wants and needs, and the law-
yer's role in organizing individuals to develop means to such shared ends, is 
one of the challenges and possibilities of community lawyering itself.232 
229. Rubinson, supra note 198, at 858-74. 
230. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Econom-
ics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 
314-15 (1999) (describing how "economic incentives" and "psychological makeups" of lawyers may 
inhibit mediated settlements). 
231. For some recent scholarship on this growing subject, see Scott L. Cummings, Community 
Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 
54 STAN. L. REv. 399 (2001); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on wwand 
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REv. 443 (2001); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY EcONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001); Michael Diamond, 
Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood. 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); 
Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 147 
(2000); Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and Social Change, 6 
CLINICAL L. REv. 217 (1999); Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development: 
Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 195 (1997). For 
a relatively early and particularly thoughtful discussion of the challenges and promise of community 
lawyering albeit in a comparative context, see Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessonsfrom Drie-
Jontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 699. There is also an increasing recognition that 
the traditional individual representation model of legal services should be expanded to also comprise 
community lawyering. See Housman, supra note 22, at 4OS-D9. 
232. For a thoughtful exploration of this point, see White, supra note 231. See also MARTHA R. 
MAHONEY ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 763 (2003). In the text, 
the authors state: 
Movements for transformation take place through the lives and work of people and communi-
ties for whom lawyers are at most a small part of the story. Therefore, an important question 
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a. What Do Community Lawyers Do? 
Community lawyers engage in a range of activities. Attracting and 
maintaining affordable housing in low-income communities is often a pri-
mary goal, and to that end, community lawyers often work with non-profit 
community development organizations, government agencies, legislators, 
tenant groups, and private developers on projects and transactions-
including projects that qualify for the Low Income Housing Tax Credit.233 
Some community lawyers represent community organizations in gaining 
50 I (c )(3) tax status,234 drafting corporate organization and governance 
documents, and providing general counsel on transactions and projects in 
which such organizations are engaged.235 Others assist community entre-
preneurs in attracting capital, organizing as commercial entities, and provid-
ing general advice so that small businesses owned and run by community 
residents serve the communities in which they are 10cated.236 Still others 
work with community organizations to identify services a community 
needs--child-care facilities, banks, youth centers-and help to develop 
means to bring these services into being.237 Others lobby for legislation or 
engage in political activism on behalf of economic justice for low-income 
communities.238 
These frequently productive lawyering (or, in some cases, quasi-
lawyering) activities can help low-income individuals who live in low-
income communities. While not classically providing "access to justice" in 
the individual litigant's sense of the term, community lawyers can certainly 
channel and address conflict and enable groups to gain control of their lives 
in ways that, to use an overused term, end in greater empowerment, and 
empowerment is, after all, the ultimate end that access-to-justice initiatives 
seek to achieve.239 
Moreover, a classic critique of funding for conventional legal services is 
that it drains funding from social services that would directly benefit low-
income individuals. While this argument is demonstrably false,z40 commu-
nity lawyering sidesteps this issue; it resonates with rhetoric about self-
reliance and personal responsibility that is so prevalent in political dis-
Id. 
for lawyers working on social justice issues is how to carry out their professional work in 
ways that empower the people whose lives are involved. 
233. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 20851; Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312. See Cummings, supra note 231, at 439-40. 
234. 26 U.S.c. § 50I(c)(3) (2000). 
235. Cummings & Eagly, supra note 231, at 476-7K 
236. See Cummings, supra note 231, at 443. 
237. Cummings & Eagly, supra note 231, at 476-77. 
238. Cummings, supra note 231, at 444-45. 
239. See Houseman, supra note 22, at 408. 
240. Two responses among many are, first, there is no reason to believe (and many reasons to disbe-
lieve) that funds taken away from legal services would somehow find their way into social service pro-
grams, and, two, the administrative and judicial systems are so stacked against low-income disputants 
that denying legal representation is tantamount to denying them what they are entitled to by law. 
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course,241 which, in turn, can attract and has attracted funding from govern-
ment and non-governmental sources.242 Such a rare circumstance is cause 
for celebration, even if based on faulty assum~tions about what causes pov-
erty and the nature of the lives of the indigent. 43 
b. How Community Lawyering Allocates RDR 
The legal skills that are brought to bear in many forms of community 
lawyering are primarily transactional, not litigation-oriented. From the per-
spective of the allocation of RDR, this carries enormous advantages by re-
configuring the unyielding principles that otherwise control the allocation of 
RDR.244 While mediation injects RDR into a new type of third-party deci-
sion-maker instead of old style judging and, what is more, minimizes attor-
ney involvement in the process, community lawyering focuses RDR into a 
new style of lawyering and, in many instances, eliminates entirely the ne-
cessity for a separately funded third party. As opposed to the overwhelming 
task of representing individuals in dispute resolution systems that are, as 
this Article demonstrates, unyieldingly unreceptive to the needs of low-
income disputants, community lawyering cuts this Gordian knot by largely, 
if not entirely, bypassing conventional dispute resolution and turning in-
stead to markets, legislative advocacy, and political activism. 
In addition, an intriguing byproduct of community lawyering from an 
RDR perspective relates to the source of community lawyers. There is one 
source where such lawyers cannot come from: Federal regulations prohibit 
attorneys working in Legal Services Corporation-funded entities from "ini-
tiat[ing] the formation, or to act as an organizer, of any association, federa-
tion, labor union, coalition, network, alliance, or any similar entity,,245_a 
prohibition that implicates many community lawyering activities. That said, 
non-LSC-funded organizations have sprung up, financed through grants 
from foundations or state agencies, to do this work,246 and creative organiz-
ing can even, at times, engage in community lawyering while sidestepping 
241. For a fascinating treatment of how public and political discourse stigmatizes the poor, see 
Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (\991). 
See also Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver 
Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697 (\993); Lucy A. Williams, Race. Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media 
Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1159 (1995). 
242. See Cummings, supra note 231, at 401-D4. 
243. While much welfare policy relies on stereotypes and simplifications about the causes of pov· 
erty, the truth is far messier, embodying a complex amalgamation of numerous economic, demographic, 
historical. political, and cultural factors. See Michele Estrin Gilman. Communitarianism and Social 
Welfare, 66 U. PrIT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). 
244. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34. 
245. 45 C.P.R. § 1612.9(a) (2004). 
246. A leading and influential initiative in this regard is the Community Law Center in Baltimore, 
Maryland. At http://www.communitylaw.orglcommunity_law_center.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). 
For a description of the range of funding sources for community lawyering initiatives, see Louise G. 
Trubek, On Long Haul Lawyering, 2S FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801, 803-D4 (1998); Cummings, supra note 
231, at 438-39. 
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the LSC restrictions?47 Law school clinics in community lawyering have 
begun to proliferate and engage in important work in the field248_a devel-
opment that not only provides representation to communities but also au-
gurs well for a time when more private attorneys have exposure to this sort 
of practice. 
But even apart from these new conceptions of what a full-time poverty 
law practice can look like, community lawyering offers the possibility of 
attracting at least a percentage of the legions of transactional lawyers who 
dismiss pro bono as inevitably involving litigation and thus not requiring 
their expertise?49 Indeed, programs and initiatives designed to attract trans-
actional lawyers to community lawyering initiatives have begun to ap-
pear?50 While, as I have noted, pro bono cannot be an answer to access of 
justice inequities,251 there remains a huge untapped resource of lawyering 
expertise--often concentrated at large firms-whose practice is transac-
tional and who otherwise view themselves as unqualified and uninterested 
in the classically litigation-oriented vision of representing low-income cli-
ents.252 
Thus, community lawyering has the potential to (1) bypass the third-
party actor component of RDR as a necessary condition to enhance the lives 
of the poor; (2) attract a previously untapped source of legal services by 
enticing transactional lawyers to engage in pro bono or reduced fee practice 
on behalf of low-income communities; (3) draw upon the creativity and 
energy of low-income clients to, as with mediation, do an end-run around 
the disputing-through-agents condition of RDR theory and add a third ele-
ment-parties' own energy, time, and creativity-that contributes to total 
RDR allocations. 
247. Trubek, supra note 246, at 804. 
248. Peter Pitegoff, Law School Initiatives in Housing and Community Development, 4 B.U. PuB. 
INT. L.J. 275 (1995). Increa~ing numbers of law schools have community lawyering clinics, including 
schools of law at Temple University, the University of Baltimore, the University of Maryland, and the 
University of New Mexico. 
249. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673, 677 (1998) (noting that community lawyering "provides new opportunities for 
collaborations between poverty lawyers and the private bar" and "holds the potential to expand pro bono 
work beyond the litigation departments of law firms by tapping into the skills and expertise of corporate 
lawyers"). 
250. See, e.g., Deborah Austin, Pro Bono Business Lawyers: Partners for Community Change, 17 
MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J. 45 (2003). One organization named "Power of Attorney" funds pro bono 
community lawyering 11litJatJves nationwide. See Power of Attorney, available at 
http://www.powerofattorney.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). Community lawyering has also begun to 
infiltrate the consciousness of bar associations. See, e.g" David Dominguez, Community La .. yerinlf, 
UTAH BJ., May 2004. at 31. 
251. See supra text accompanying notes 177-81. 
252. There is even the possibility of appealing to the market sense of the private bar: One thread of 
community economic development literature touts how "low-income communities [are) underutilized 
markets with rich economic opportunities for businesses." Cummings, supra note 231, at 402. While 
recent commentators suggest that such ideas vastly minimize the profound importance of the social and 
political realities underlying poverty in America, id., the fact remains that some community lawyering 
initiatives might generate attorney's fees either immediately or in the future-something that rarely if 
ever happens in most traditional forms of litigation on behalf of low-income clients. 
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As with mediation, however, all of this sounds well and good in terms 
of RDR, but simply arguing that more community lawyering is the answer 
to problems of access to justice is vastly simplistic, if not misleading. The 
intractability of poverty as a cultural, social, and political fact remains 
enormously troubling. Some have convincingly argued that community 
lawyering, in its more market-based incarnations, has been ineffective and 
assert that attacking poverty at its roots requires a return to progressive po-
litical activism and organization or "economic justice."m It is unclear 
whether such an organizational and political focus, if indeed this is neces-
sary, can achieve much except at the margins. Moreover, the very focus of 
community lawyering on communities masks enormous complexities. Mter 
all, what precisely is a community? To what degree do the interests of indi-
viduals within a community converge or diverge? To what degree do indi-
viduals identify with many distinct cultural, racial, social, as well as geo-
graphic communities, and what does this mean for a community lawyering 
practice ?254 
These are difficult questions, perhaps even discouraging ones in terms 
of predicting the ultimate value of initiatives undertaken under the umbrella 
of community lawyering. The answer might well be the same as it is with 
mediation: What else is there? It is a shot, and a shot that potentially 
breaks free of the paralyzing rigidity of RDR allocations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined a double tragedy in how we allocate the re-
sources of dispute resolution. The first tragedy is how appallingly inequita-
ble this allocation is. The second is that the larger world of popular and 
political discourse seems utterly disinterested in the first tragedy. It is as-
tonishing that the principle of equal justice-a principle enshrined in virtu-
ally every articulation and embodiment of civic virtue and pride in our de-
mocracy, from courthouse facades, to the Pledge of Allegiance, to the ico-
nography of "blind justice"-remains so obviously and utterly hollow and 
illusory. 
I have no illusions that this Article will be heard when so many others 
have not. I have tried to open up fresh ways of conceptualizing these trage-
dies and articulating potential solutions. Individual calls from a crowd can 
sometimes combine to transform indifference into action. Or so we can 
only hope. 
253. For a particularly compelling examination of this perspective, see generally Cummings, supra 
note 231. 
254. Daniel T. Ortiz, Categorical Community, 51 STAN. L. REV. 769, 806 (1999). 
